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Abstract
This paper reviews the existing empirical literature on the e¤ects of o¤shoring and foreign
activities of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) on the labor markets of developed countries. Avail-
able results provide robust evidence in support of the fear that material o¤shoring worsens wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers; on the contrary, results are still too ambiguous
to support concerns that material o¤shoring raises the elasticity of unskilled labor demand and
produces adverse short-run employment dynamics. Service o¤shoring does not reduce total labor
demand signicantly and does not pose serious threats to human capital accumulation. Finally,
MNEs tend to substitute domestic labor with foreign labor, but the relationship is weak; moreover,
substitutability is mainly driven by horizontal, market-seeking, Foreign Direct Investments.
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1. Introduction and motivation
During the last two decades, opponents to globalization have directed harsh protests against o¤shoring
and foreign activities of domestic Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), arguing - among other things
- that they may produce severe deterioration in the economic fortunes of employees in developed
countries. Opposition exacerbated in the last few years, reaching its height at the onset of the 2004 U.S.
presidential election (Amiti and Wei, 2005a; Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). The opposition, however,
has been based on specic examples of rms that have red domestic employees or exposed them to
wage cuts, after the decision to expand operations abroad. Similar experiences are denitely harsh
from the perspective of the workers involved. Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of an economist, they do
not probably su¢ ce to conclude that o¤shoring and MNEs are bad threats for the national economy
and have to be impeded with the right policy interventions. Large evidence, in fact, suggests the
existence of a positive link between o¤shoring and MNEs, on one hand, and productivity growth, on
the other (Mann, 2003; Amiti and Wei, 2006; Olsen, 2006). By contrast, the labor market e¤ects of
o¤shoring and MNEs activities could end up being small for the national economy, once accounting
for the complete adjustment in a general equilibrium perspective. If this were so, the most e¤ective
way of dealing with o¤shoring and foreign activities of MNEs would be to design appropriate wage
insurance schemes and retraining programs for the a¤ected workers, rather than trying to restrict
the access of rms to these internationalization strategies. This would allow governments to spread
more evenly the overall benets of o¤shoring and MNEs activities across domestic workers. Based
on this argument, this paper tries to draw some conclusions about the magnitude and nature of the
labor market e¤ects of o¤shoring and MNEs, by reviewing the existing empirical literature focusing
on developed countries.
To clarify terminology, I will refer to o¤shoring as the practice through which rms fragment their
production processes and relocate some stages abroad, with the main aim of exploiting cross-country
cost di¤erentials due to relative di¤erences in resource endowments1. I will specialize the denition
to material o¤shoring when referring to foreign relocation of purely productive stages (like assembly
or production of specic intermediate components). I will instead specialize the denition to service
o¤shoring when referring to foreign relocation of service tasks (like call center operations, back o¢ ce
activities, accounting, and the like). Turning to MNEs, I will often exploit the standard classication
based on the horizontal or vertical nature of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI): vertical FDI are
meant to transfer stages of production abroad to exploit cost di¤erentials, whereas horizontal FDI are
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meant to replicate abroad the same activities as those performed domestically, with the aim of serving
local or neighboring markets. Clearly, the relationship between o¤shoring and foreign activities of
MNEs is not exhaustive: neither o¤shoring takes place only through FDI, nor do MNEs exist only
to arbitrage over cross-country cost di¤erentials. O¤shoring can take place also through arms length
contracts with foreign una¢ liated parties [in which case, it is usually referred to in the literature as
international outsourcing (Helpman, 2006)]; moreover, when it does occur through FDI, o¤shoring
leads to vertical FDI . This distinction is clear in theory2. In common discussions, however, o¤shoring
and foreign activities of MNEs are often taken (erroneously) as alternative denitions of the same
phenomenon: the common belief is that o¤shoring can take place only within the boundaries of MNEs
(that is, between parents and a¢ liates) and that the only aim of MNEs is to fragment production
internationally. Instead, most of todays o¤shoring occurs through arms length contracts between
una¢ liated parties and most of todays outward FDI from developed countries are horizontal. This
means that the labor market e¤ects of MNEs activities and o¤shoring are likely to be quite di¤erent
from each other and a careful analysis should treat them separately. I will take this approach in the
paper3.
It is already well known that both o¤shoring and FDI have sharply risen in the last decades.
Figure 1 shows the growth in world FDI outows between 1975 and 2005, as well as the growth in
FDI outows from eight developed countries that accounted for 60% of the total in 2005. The gure
shows striking evidence of dramatic FDI growth since the mid-1980s, especially compared with GDP
growth; moreover, at least until 2000, the trend in worldwide outows has almost entirely been driven
by that in outows from developed countries4. During the same period, o¤shoring has become a
widespread practice in most developed countries, especially in the manufacturing sector. The solid
line in Figure 2 shows the trend in material o¤shoring by U.S. manufacturing sectors between 1972
and 2002. Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), I proxy material o¤shoring with the share of
imported intermediate goods on total non-energy inputs purchases5. This share has increased from
5.1% in 1972 to 18.1% in 2002. Similar trends have occurred in almost all industrialized economies
(Feenstra, 1998). For instance, Campa and Goldberg (1997) show that between 1974 and 1993 the
above share has risen from 15.9 to 20.2 percent in the Canadian manufacturing sector, and from 13.4
to 21.6 percent in the U.K. industrial sector. The picture does not change if one uses an indicator of
vertical specialization as an alternative proxy for material o¤shoring: vertical specialization - dened
as the share of exportsvalue accounted for by imported inputs (Hummels et al., 2001) - has soared
in most developed countries between 1970 and 1990, passing from 3.9 to 7.4 percent in the U.S., from
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14.3 to 19.1 percent in the U.K., from 17.5 to 23.2 percent in Canada, from 14.0 to 18.7 percent in
France and from 14.2 to 16.3 percent in Germany (Hummels et al., 1998). More recently, thanks
to improvements in information and communication technologies that have eased the tradability of
services (Freund and Weinhold, 2002; Lipsey, 2006), the practice of o¤shoring has been extended to
service tasks. The dashed line in Figure 2 shows a proxy for service o¤shoring by U.S. manufacturing
sectors between 1995 and 2002. The proxy is constructed along the same lines as that for material
o¤shoring, that is, by computing the share of imported private services on total non-energy inputs
purchases. While data are unavailable for the pre-1995 period, the gure shows that service o¤shoring
was virtually close to zero in 1995. Since then, however, service o¤shoring rose exponentially, gaining
roughly three percentage points in less than a decade. Similar patterns have occurred in the U.K.
(Amiti and Wei, 2005a) and much anecdotal evidence suggests that service o¤shoring has been growing
rapidly also in other developed countries.
The upsurge in o¤shoring and FDI outows has raised strong concerns in developed countries about
the potentially severe detrimental e¤ects of both phenomena on the economic fortunes of domestic
employees. In this paper, I discuss such concerns by reviewing the relevant literature about the e¤ects
exerted by material and service o¤shoring and by foreign activities of MNEs on the labor markets of
developed countries.
I start from material o¤shoring in Section 2. During the 1980s and the rst half of the 1990s, the
strong increase in wage inequality and in relative skilled employment has been taken as evidence that
material o¤shoring hurts unskilled workers employed in manufacturing, by easing the possibility of
substituting them with imported intermediate inputs from less developed countries; moreover, material
o¤shoring has been blamed to reduce the bargaining power of the unskilled, by making their labor
demand more elastic, and to expose these workers to higher risk of job losses. Empirical studies have
provided evidence in favor of a positive e¤ect of material o¤shoring on wage inequality. This e¤ect
is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to that of skill-biased technical change. On the contrary,
evidence is still inconclusive on the possibility that material o¤shoring makes unskilled labor demand
more elastic, as well as on the hypothesis that it increases the risk of job losses.
I turn to service o¤shoring in Section 3. The weak labor market dynamics experienced by the U.S.
and most other developed countries after the dot-com bust of the late 1990s has triggered oppositions
to service o¤shoring: rms have been blamed to shift jobs abroad, thereby contributing to the labor
market weakness. More recently, service o¤shoring has been blamed to pose a serious threat to
skilled labor demand, and, through this channel, to the whole process of human capital accumulation.
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Existing empirical evidence, however, do not support either of these concerns: service o¤shoring has
insofar exerted no signicant e¤ect on total labor demand, and has actually fostered relative skilled
labor demand.
I deal with the labor market e¤ects of foreign activities of MNEs in Section 4. The main fear
manifested by opponents of globalization is that national MNEs expand their foreign operations to
take advantage of lower labor costs in developing countries, and, through this channel, substitute
domestic labor with cheaper foreign labor. This concern, however, is at odds with empirical ndings:
although some evidence exists in favor of a substitutability relationship between domestic and foreign
labor employed by MNEs, such a relationship seems too weak for the latter to pose serious threats to
national workers; moreover, substitutability is mainly driven by horizontal and market seeking, rather
than by vertical and cost-saving FDI.
In section 5, I nally draw a few conclusions from the existing empirical evidence and provide a
few suggestions for future research.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a comprehensive view of the labor market e¤ects
of o¤shoring and MNEs activities. By doing so, the paper improves upon previous surveys, that have
instead taken a more partial perspective and analyzed just one of the two phenomena in isolation:
either o¤shoring or MNEs. The most notable examples of such surveys are those by Feenstra (2004,
chp. 4), Feenstra and Hanson (2003) and Hijzen (2005) on material o¤shoring and those by Barba
Navaretti, Venables et al. (2004, chp. 9) on MNEs6. A second contribution of the paper is the specic
attention devoted to service o¤shoring. Although still limited, the literature on this topic has been
growing rapidly in recent years, and some satisfactory conclusions can already be drawn on some of
the most relevant concerns for developed countries; moreover, given the importance and the novelty
of the topic, as well as its expected di¤usion in the near future, reviewing the state of the art in the
literature may be useful as a basis for future research.
2.Material o¤shoring
Since material o¤shoring entails foreign relocation of unskill-intensive production stages, the fraction
of the workforce that is potentially more at risk in developed countries is represented by the unskilled.
The largest stream of empirical contributions has analyzed the role played by material o¤shoring
in explaining the declining fortunes of unskilled workers in the last two decades, as symptomized
by worsening wage inequality between them and the skilled. Fewer studies exist also on other two
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related issues: the possibility for material o¤shoring to make unskilled labor demand more elastic, and
to thereby lower the bargaining power of the unskilled; the short-run adjustment costs to material
o¤shoring, in terms of job losses.
2.1. E¤ects on relative skilled labor demand and wage inequality
2.1.1. Setting the issue
During the 1980s and the rst half of the 1990s, wage inequality between skilled and unskilled manu-
facturing workers has worsened in most industrialized countries. For instance, the wage ratio between
skilled (non-production) and unskilled (production) workers increased by 7% in the U.S. between 1980
and 1995. During the same period, relative skilled employment increased as well: between 1980 and
1995, the employment ratio rose by 8% in the U.S. (Figure 3). As a consequence, the non-production
workers shares of both wage bill and employment rose too: in the U.S., they increased by 9% and
6%, respectively7. Similar trends have taken place in almost all industrialized countries. In general,
economies characterized by exible labor markets have experienced sharp upsurges in both wage in-
equality and relative employment of the skilled: this is true, for example, for the U.K. (Machin, 1996)
and for Hong Kong (Hsieh and Woo, 2005). Instead, economies characterized by relatively more rigid
labor markets have seen wage inequality increasing at slower pace, but still experienced sharp increases
in relative skilled employment (Freeman and Katz, 1995; Berman et al., 1998; Katz and Autor, 1999;
Krugman, 2000).
There is by now widespread agreement among scholars that the contemporaneous rise in relative
wages and employment has been the result of an outward shift in relative skilled labor demand (Bound
and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor et al., 2005). Fewer consensus exists instead on
the determinants of such a shift. One point is extremely relevant in this respect: in all countries, the
shift has occurred within-industry. This means that relative skilled labor demand has shifted outward
because industries have raised their skill intensity of production, and not because high skill-intensive
sectors have gained employment shares at the expense of low skill-intesive sectors (Berman et al.,
1994; Machin, 1996; Bernard and Jensen, 1997; Dunne et al., 1997; Berman et al., 1998; Osburn,
2001). Therefore, the explanations for the shift have to be searched for among those factors that
could have acted within-industry. This has initially vindicated international trade: according to the
neoclassical redistributional argument based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, in fact, trade works
between-industry, by making developed countries specialize in high skill-intensive productions. There
are at least other two pieces of evidence running against the neoclassical argument for trade: since
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the early 1980s, 1) relative prices of skill-intensive goods have been declining and 2) skill-intensity of
production has been increasing (Lawrence and Slaugther, 1993; Bhagwati and Deheja, 1994; Leamer,
1996; Anderton and Brenton, 1999a; Desjonqueres et al., 1999; Krugman, 2000)8.
Economists have initially identied in technological progress the main culprit for the outward
shift in relative skilled labor demand. Since new technologies tend to complement skilled labor and
substitute unskilled labor, their labor demand e¤ects can be biased in favor of the skilled (skill-biased
technical change, SBTC). For this reason, the fast technological progress occurred since the early 1980s
could have explained part of the outward shift in relative skilled labor demand (Haskel and Slaughter,
2002; Acemoglu, 2002a). Some existing empirical studies have indeed conrmed this prediction and
identied in SBTC the most important explanation in most developed countries (see, among others,
Berman et al., 1994; Autor et al., 1998; Berman et al., 1998; Machin and van Reenen, 1998; Haskel
and Heden, 1999).
The interest in international trade has recently renewed. Three streams of theoretical literature
have in fact identied new channels through which trade could cause an outward shift in relative labor
demand within-industry. According to the rst stream, international trade triggers SBTC (Neary,
2002; Acemoglu, 2002b, 2003; Thoenig and Verdier, 2003; Ekholm and Midelfart Knarvik, 2005).
According to the second stream, based on the new trade theories, international trade triggers skilled-
biased scale e¤ects (Epifani and Gancia, 2004, 2006). Finally, according to the third stream, it is trade
in intermediate goods and material o¤shoring to matter (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999, 2003). The
latter channel will be the focus of this section.
How can material o¤shoring induce a within-industry shift in relative skilled labor demand? Briey,
suppose that rms have the opportunity to fragment their production processes internationally. Fol-
lowing standard factor-proportion considerations, they will tend to relocate unskill-intensive stages
of production in less-developed economies, in order to exploit their relatively larger endowment of
unskilled labor. This practice gives rise to trade in intermediates, because goods produced in di¤erent
locations have to be collected in a single place to be assembled into the nal good. The e¤ects on
relative labor demand are straightforward: since the stages of production moved abroad make in-
tensive use of unskilled-labor, the skill intensity of home production rises and relative skilled labor
demand shifts outward. This e¤ect occurs within-industry, because domestic sectors increase their
skill-intensity of production9. Hence, material o¤shoring may produce labor demand e¤ects which are
observationally equivalent to those of SBTC (Feenstra, 1998)10. A large stream of empirical studies
has ourished since the mid-1990s with the aim of testing these theoretical predictions. The main
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result is that material o¤shoring did, in fact, contribute to shift relative skilled labor demand outward,
thereby worsening wage inequality and raising relative employment of the skilled; this is true not only
for the U.S. and the U.K., but generally holds for most developed countries.
2.1.2. Empirical framework and measurement of o¤shoring
Assume that a representative rm in industry i (i = 1; :::; N) produces a given amount of output (Y )
using skilled (S) and unskilled (U) labor; in the short-run, capital (K) is treated as a quasi-xed
input. Assuming that the short-run variable cost function of the rm has the translog form, Shepards
lemma yields an expression for the optimal demand of skilled labor in share-form:
SHS;i = S + SU ln

wS
wU

i
+ SY lnYi + SK lnKi +
ZX
z=1
Sz ln zi (2.1)
where SHS;i is the share of skilled labor in total variable costs (wage bill), w stands for wage and
z = 1; :::; Z are shift-factors that can a¤ect total costs and thus optimal demand for skilled labor11;
among them, these studies include a proxy for the intensity of material o¤shoring (moss). Estimating
equation (2.1) allows to identify the parameters Sz. If S;moss > 0, material o¤shoring raises the
share of skilled labor in total variable costs; this is tantamount to say that material o¤shoring shifts
relative skilled labor demand outward.
How can material o¤shoring be measured? Feenstra and Hanson (1996) propose to use imports
of intermediate inputs as a proxy. The argument is simple: part of the goods whose production is
o¤shored have to be shipped back to the home country to be either assembled into a nal product
or sold under the brand name of domestic rms. Hence, material o¤shoring is positively correlated
with imports of intermediate inputs, and the latter can be used as a proxy. Notice that this denition
uses the term "intermediate inputs" loosely, because it includes both intermediate components of a
broader production process that will be completed at home and nal goods entirely produced abroad
but sold under the brand name of national rms.
Imported intermediate inputs by industry i (IIIi) can be estimated by combining input-output
tables and nal imports data as follows:
IIIi =
KX
k=1
[input purchases of good k by industry i] 
imports of good k
apparent consumption of good k

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where "input purchases of good k by industry i" can be retrieved from input-output accounts,
while "apparent consumption of good k" can be computed as production + imports - exports of good
k. The second right-hand side term is the share of apparent consumption of good k accounted for by
imports in the economy as a whole. Assuming that this share is constant across sectors, it can be
applied to the overall amount of good k used as an intermediate input in each industry (i.e., the rst
right-hand side term) to obtain a proxy of imported intermediate inputs at the industry-level. Notice
that, due to the use of nal imports data in the second right hand side term, IIIi consists both of
parts and components to be assembled at home and of nal goods to be sold under the brand name
of national rms. With this measure at hand, mossi can nally be obtained by normalizing IIIi with
total purchases of non-energy inputs (NE) by industry i12:
mossi =
IIIi
NEi
(2.2)
A few comments on (2.2) are in order. First, notice that, because of the use of aggregate, economy-
wide, imports data, (2.2) does not allow to disentangle o¤shoring through arms length contracts from
o¤shoring through production transfer within MNEs: both o¤shoring modes, in fact, raise IIIi. In
the next section, I will review a few studies that use measures of production transfer within MNEs
to capture the second o¤shoring mode. Second, (2.2) can be specialized to proxy both a narrow
and a broad concept of o¤shoring (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999): narrow o¤shoring accounts only for
imports of intermediate inputs from the same industry, whereas broad o¤shoring accounts for imports
of intermediate inputs from all industries.
Although (2.2) is probably the best proxy for material o¤shoring, data limitation has often pre-
vented researchers from using it. In what follows, I will therefore take (2.2) as the ideal measure and
describe alternative proxies when reviewing those studies that could not rely on (2.2).
2.1.3. Results
Countries with exible labor markets: U.S., Canada, U.K. and Hong Kong As I men-
tioned, in countries with exible labor markets, the outward shift in relative skilled labor demand has
brought about sharp upsurges in both relative wages and relative employment of the skilled. Existing
literature has focused on four cases: U.S., Canada, U.K. and Hong Kong.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) compute broad material o¤shoring for 435 U.S. manufacturing indus-
tries over the period 1972-94; Feenstra and Hanson (1999) extend this computation to 447 industries
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from 1972 to 1990 and calculate also narrow material o¤shoring. In both cases, skilled and unskilled
workers are proxied by non-production and production workers respectively. Coe¢ cient estimates
from (2.1) suggest that the rise in broad material o¤shoring has explained from 32 to 53 percent of
the observed increase in the non-production workers share of wage bill during the 1980s (Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996); narrow material o¤shoring accounted instead for 13 to 23 percent of the increase
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). These gures imply that, during the 1980s, broad o¤shoring has led to
an annual increase in the non-production workers share of wage bill of 0.12-0.20 percent, whereas nar-
row o¤shoring has induced an annual rise of 0.05-0.09 percentage points. These results are conrmed
by Anderton et al. (2002a) and Anderton and Oscarsson (2006).
Similar evidence is found for Canada by Yan (2006). Using data on 84 manufacturing industries
between 1981 and 1996 and proxing broad material o¤shoring with the log of imported inputs in each
industry - i.e., only the numerator of (2.2) - the author nds that broad material o¤shoring led to
an annual increase of 0.12 percentage points in the non-production workers share of wage bill. The
author also estimates equation (2.1) using the non-production workers share of total employment as
the regressand, a practice often used by studies on European countries (see below). Results show that
material o¤shoring led to a 0.10 annual percentage increase in this share.
An important role for material o¤shoring in explaining the outward shift in relative skilled labor
demand has been detected also in the U.K.. Anderton and Brenton (1999b) analyze 11 textile and
non-electrical machinery industries between 1970 and 1983. The lack of data on imported intermediate
inputs for early years prevents the authors from using (2.2) as a proxy for material o¤shoring; as an
alternative, they proxy material o¤shoring with import competition from low-wage countries, dened
as the ratio between imports from these economies and total industrys consumption: this measure
could be a good proxy in the case of the U.K., whose national rms have generally moved their low
skill-intensive stages of production to low-wage countries, relatively better endowed with unskilled
labor. Results show that the e¤ects of material o¤shoring have been particularly important in the less
skill-intensive textile sector: in this industry, material o¤shoring has in fact accounted for about 40%
of the rise in the skilled labor share of wage bill13; when equation (2.1) is estimated using the skilled
labor share of employment as the dependent variable, material o¤shoring is found to explain up to
one third of the observed increase in this share.
Hsieh and Woo (2005) nd comparable evidence also for Hong Kong, using a panel of 54 manufac-
turing industries over the period 1971-96. The authors focus just on o¤shoring to China, which has
sharply increased since 1980, and proxy it by means of two alternative measures: the rst is similar
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to (2.2), but with only imported intermediates from China at the numerator; the second, instead,
is the share of total imports from China on industrys consumption - i.e., import competition from
China. Results show that material o¤shoring has been an important determinant of the outward shift
in relative skilled labor demand occurred in Hong Kong, explaining as much as 40-50% of the increase
in the non-production workers share of wage bill during the period.
Summing up, in countries characterized by exible labor markets, rising material o¤shoring during
the 1980s explained a large part of the outward shift in relative skilled labor demand and of the
resulting increase in wage inequality and relative employment of the skilled.
Countries with less exible labor markets: the case of Europe In Europe, due to lower
wage exibility, the outward shift in relative labor demand has caused less dramatic increases in
wage inequality, accompanied however by signicant upsurges in relative skilled employment and in
unemployment for the unskilled. Several existing studies have taken into account the higher wage
rigidity in these economies by slightly modifying the estimating equation in (2.1) through substitution
of the skilled labor share of wage bill with either the skilled labor share of employment or the relative
employment of the skilled. Due to data limitation, these studies have often been prevented from
using (2.2) as a proxy for material o¤shoring, and thereby forced to found alternative measures.
Notwithstanding these changes from the baseline framework, results for Europe are consistent with
those for countries with more exible labor markets: also in Europe has material o¤shoring played a
large role in shifting relative skilled labor demand outward.
Two studies focus on Sweden (Anderton et al., 2002b; Hansson, 2000). Both measure material
o¤shoring as import competition from low-wage countries, dened as the ratio of imports from non-
OECD Members and industrys consumption; however, while Hansson (2000) uses nominal variables
to construct the o¤shoring proxy, Anderton et al. (2002b) use variables in real terms. This distinction
turns out to be extremely relevant. In fact, when constructed in nominal terms, this o¤shoring proxy
need not increase when import competition rises. For instance, if imports prices decreased due to
tougher import competition, the proxy for o¤shoring could either rise or fall, depending on the import
demand elasticity; moreover, increasing import competition could lead domestic producers to raise
the quality, and thus the price, of their products, thereby boosting the denominator of the formula
and eventually lowering the value of the o¤shoring proxy. Indeed, using a panel of 34 manufacturing
industries over the period 1970-93, Hansson (2000) nds that the proxy for material o¤shoring mea-
sured in nominal terms explained only a limited fraction of the outward shift in relative skilled labor
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demand: precisely, it explained at most 5% of the observed increase in the skilled labor share of total
employment14. By contrast, using a panel of 41 manufacturing industries over the period 1975-93,
Anderton et al. (2002b) nd that the proxy for material o¤shoring measured in real terms had some-
what larger e¤ects, explaining roughly 25% of the observed increase in the skilled (non-production)
labor share of total wage bill and 15% of the observed increase in the share of total employment.
Similar evidence is found also for France by Strauss-Kahn (2003) and for Spain by Minondo and
Rubert (2006). Strauss-Kahn (2003) uses a panel of 50 French industries (including manufacturing,
agriculture and mining) over the period 1977-93 and computes narrow material o¤shoring as in (2.2).
The estimating equation is a slight modication of (2.1), with the within-industry contribution to
the change in the skilled labor share of wage bill as the regressand. Results show signicant e¤ects of
material o¤shoring: the latter has accounted for 11% of the within-industry increase in the skilled-labor
share of wage bill between 1977 and 1985, and for 25% over the period 1985-93. Results are robust
to the distinction of material o¤shoring to non-OECD (low-wage) and OECD (high-wage) countries,
though material o¤shoring to non-OECD countries has exerted somewhat larger e¤ects. Minondo and
Rubert (2006) reach similar conclusions by using a panel of 12 Spanish manufacturing industries over
the period 1986-94 and estimating equation (2.1) with the skilled / unskilled employment ratio as the
dependent variable. They nd a positive contribution of narrow material o¤shoring to the observed
increase in relative employment of the skilled15. Also in this case, o¤shoring to low-income countries
has exerted somewhat stronger e¤ects on relative skilled labor demand.
The e¤ects of material o¤shoring on relative skilled labor demand have been analyzed also in a set
of countries in Central Europe: Austria, Italy and Germany. The interest in this countries arose from
the sharp increase in material o¤shoring to many formerly centrally planned economies in Eastern
Europe (CEECs, henceforth) since 1990. Indeed, results from these studies attribute a substantial
role to material o¤shoring to the CEECs. Starting from Austria, Egger and Egger (2005) focus on 20
manufacturing industries between 1990 and 1998 the period right after the fall of the Communist
regime - and compute narrow o¤shoring as in (2.2), but using only imported intermediates from the
CEECs at the numerator. The estimating equation di¤ers from (2.1) in two respects. First, in order to
account for wage rigidities in the Austrian labor market, relative employment of the skilled is used as
the regressand instead of the skilled labor share of wage bill16. Second, in order to account for indirect
e¤ects of o¤shoring through inter-industry spillovers, an additional variable is included among the
regressors: the weighted skilled / unskilled employment ratio, with weights constructed using input-
output coe¢ cients, that gauge the degree of industrial interdependence. Results show that o¤shoring
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to the CEECs did increase relative skilled labor demand; this e¤ect has generally been magnied by
inter-industry spillovers. A simulation exercise shows that an 87% increase in o¤shoring to the CEECs
would have augmented the skilled / unskilled employment ratio by 17%17. These results have been
questioned by a recent study by Lorentowicz et al. (2005): the authors nd in fact that material
o¤shoring alone would have reduced wage inequality and relative skilled employment in Austria. The
analysis makes use of a panel of 15 industrial sectors between 1995 and 2002 and material o¤shoring
is proxied as in (2.2); crucially, Lorentowicz et al. (2005) use total imports of intermediate inputs and
not just imports from the CEECs, as Egger and Egger (2005) do instead. Estimation of equation (2.1)
with relative employment of the skilled as the regressand shows that, despite the observed increase
in this ratio, material o¤shoring alone would have lowered it by 24%; similar results arise when the
skilled labor share of wage bill is used as the regressand: material o¤shoring would have lowered this
share by 13.6%. The main explanation for the di¤erent results found by these two studies on Austria is
probably the use of di¤erent proxies for material o¤shoring: since Austrian rms have mainly relocated
their unskill-intensive stages of production to the CEECs, the proxy used by Egger and Egger (2005)
is more likely to produce positive e¤ects on relative skilled labor demand18.
Turning to Italy, Helg and Tajoli (2005) use a panel of 20 manufacturing industries over the 1990s
and construct a more conservative measure of material o¤shoring than the one in (2.2): the ratio
between Outward Processing Trade (OPT) imports and industrys production; OPT imports occur
when rms move abroad some intermediate goods for reasons of processing and then import back
the processed goods. This measure has the advantage of describing more closely the main feature
of material o¤shoring, that is, the choice by rms of the number of stages and of the amount of
processing to perform abroad. The bulk of Italian OPT is done by traditional (low skill-intensive)
sectors and takes place in the CEECs. The authors estimate equation (2.1) with the skilled labor
share of employment as the dependent variable, in order to account for wage rigidities in the Italian
labor market19. Results suggest that material o¤shoring has contributed to the increase in relative
employment of the skilled in Italy. In the same study, Helg and Tajoli repeat the analysis for Germany.
In this case, material o¤shoring is found to exert no signicant e¤ect on relative skilled labor demand.
The authors justify the di¤erent results for Italy and Germany in the light of the characteristics of the
industries that resort more heavily to OPT in the two countries: while, in Italy, these industries are
mainly low skill-intensive, in Germany, their degree of skill-intensity is very close to the manufacturing
average; as a consequence, increasing OPT is likely to have induced some shift in relative labor demand
in Italy, but not in Germany. Another possible explanation is that the OPT proxy captures only a
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specic facet of the whole o¤shoring phenomenon and is likely to underestimate its actual size: if only
a small fraction of material o¤shoring by German rms takes place through OPT, this measure will
not produce signicant e¤ects on relative skilled labor demand. Furthermore, as in the case of Austria,
also in Germany most unskill-intensive stages of production have been relocated to the CEECs; thus
using an aggregate measure of material o¤shoring may not be suited to capture this specic aspect
of the phenomenon. And, in fact, Geishecker (2006) nds that, when measured as in (2.2) but with
imported intermediate inputs only from the CEECs at the numerator, material o¤shoring does appear
to exert signicant e¤ects of relative skilled labor demand in Germany. The author uses a panel of 23
manufacturing industries over the period 1991-2000 and nds that narrow (broad) o¤shoring to the
CEECs has explained more than 47% (53%) of the observed increase in the skilled labor share of wage
bill; as expected, the e¤ect of o¤shoring to the rest of the EU and to the rest of the world is either
insignicant (narrow) or signicant but smaller (broad).
All above evidence suggests that material o¤shoring has been an important source of wage inequal-
ity in developed countries, and has thus penalized the economic fortunes of national unskilled workers
relative to their skilled counterparts. Two questions, however, are left unanswered by this literature.
First, what is the role of MNEs? As I mentioned before, due to the use of aggregate imports data, the
above contributions are unable to disentangle o¤shoring through production transfer within MNEs
from o¤shoring through arms length contracts with foreign suppliers. Given the attention paid to
MNEs in the ongoing debate about the e¤ects of globalization, this issue deserves separate attention.
Second, is a dichotomous classication of labor too restrictive? Classifying workers in just two cate-
gories may hide specic e¤ects of material o¤shoring on subgroups of employees and sub-occupations;
understanding these e¤ects is important for policy reasons. Therefore, I will now move to review
contributions that have tried to answer these two questions.
Material o¤shoring through production transfer within MNEs In practice, o¤shoring is a
more complex phenomenon than described by (2.2). In fact, that measure captures all those cases in
which goods are processed abroad and then reimported, regardless of whether the transfer of produc-
tion occurs through arms length contracts with foreign suppliers or through direct establishment of
foreign plants by national rms. Therefore, in order to disentangle the specic contribution of MNEs to
material o¤shoring, one has to construct a di¤erent proxy, measuring only production transfer within
MNEs20. Moreover, MNEs involved in o¤shoring often carry out assembly activities in their foreign
a¢ liates and then use these a¢ liates as a local presence to serve either the foreign market or other
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neighboring economies [export-platform FDI (Ekholm et al., 2003)]: in this case, production transfer
within MNEs does not entail intra-rm trade in intermediates, but rather results in the expansion of
foreign a¢ liates relative to the parent.
How important is production transfer within MNEs? The answer is that, although surely not
negligible and rising, it is still a tiny fraction of total material o¤shoring. Slaughter (2000b) shows
that, between 1977 and 1994, foreign a¢ liates of American MNEs have increased their share on MNE-
wide employment, value added and capital stock and given rise to increasing trade ows with their
parents in the U.S. and with other a¢ liates in foreign countries. Nevertheless, at the beginning of
the 1990s, foreign a¢ liates accounted for less than 40% of all intermediate inputs imported by U.S.
parents. Hence, the bulk of todays material o¤shoring occurs through arms length contracts with
foreign suppliers and also MNEs resort heavily to this o¤shoring mode. Nike is a case in point.
Feenstra (1998) reports 1993 gures showing that:
About 75,000 people are employed in Asia in the production of shoes and clothing [...],
though only a few hundred of these are actually employees of the company. The rest are
employed in factories that have some contractual arrangement with Nike, possibly run by
third parties, such as South Korean entrepreneurs (Feenstra, 1998, pp. 36).
Given the limited importance of production transfer within MNEs, one may reasonably expect
that it played only a minor role in explaining the outward shift in relative skilled labor demand in
developed countries. This is what existing studies have found. More precisely, although production
transfer has exerted signicant e¤ects on relative skilled labor demand within MNEs, these e¤ects
appear negligible when compared to the overall, economy-wide, outward shift.
In the general framework discussed before, these studies replace (2.2) with a measure of production
transfer within MNEs. Equation (2.1) is estimated by using either MNE-level data or industry-level
data, after having aggregated the proxy for production transfer at the industry level: in the former
case, the focus of the analysis is the contribution of production transfer to the outward shift in relative
skilled labor demand within the MNEs; in the second case, the focus is the contribution of production
transfer to the economy-wide outward shift.
How is production transfer measured? In general, existing contributions use the share of foreign
a¢ liates employment on total, MNE-wide, employment:
PRODTRANSF =
P
i empiP
i empi + empp
(2.3)
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where i = 1; :::; N indexes foreign a¢ liates and p stands for parent. Clearly, this indicator captures
all those cases in which o¤shoring takes place within MNEs, regardless of whether goods produced
abroad are reimported or sold in foreign markets. In both cases, in fact, a¢ liates gain employment
shares at the expense of the parent.
Studies with MNE-level data have been carried out by Head and Ries (2002) for Japan and Hansson
(2005) for Sweden. Head and Ries (2002) use data on 1052 Japanese manufacturing MNEs over the
period 1971-90 and nd a positive e¤ect of production transfer on relative skilled (non-production)
labor demand in Japanese parents21. This positive e¤ect is stronger when production transfer occurs
in a¢ liates located in low-income countries, which is consistent with the idea that Japanese MNEs
o¤shore low skill-intensive stages of production to subsidiaries operating in countries with a relatively
larger endowment of unskilled labor. Nonetheless, when compared to the economy-wide, overall,
shift in relative skilled labor demand, the contribution of production transfer appears very small in
magnitude: Head and Ries estimate in fact that it accounted for no more than 9% of the overall
observed rise in the skilled labor share of wage bill between 1970 and 1989. This evidence is conrmed
by Hansson (2005) for Sweden. The author computes (2.3) using data on a¢ liates employment in
(low-wage) non-OECD countries. The analysis is carried out on both a balanced sample including 27
manufacturing MNEs in 1990, 1993 and 1997 and an unbalanced sample including also observations
for 35 additional MNEs in 1990 and 1993 and for 11 additional MNEs in 1993 and 1997. Results
show that production transfer to non-OECD countries has exerted positive e¤ects on the skilled labor
share of parents wage bill between 1993 and 1997, but not between 1990 and 1993; the reason is
that production transfer to non-OECD countries took o¤ only in 199322. The magnitude of the e¤ect
amounts to roughly 15% of the observed increase in the skilled labor share of parents wage bill, and
is therefore likely to have explained an even smaller fraction of the economy-wide increase. On the
contrary, production transfer to OECD-based a¢ liates did not exert any signicant e¤ect on parents
relative skilled labor demand.
The only two studies using industry-level data are Slaughter (2000b) for the U.S. and Falzoni
and Grasseni (2003) for Italy. Slaughter (2000b) uses a panel of about 1500 U.S. parents and 8000
foreign a¢ liates, belonging to 32 manufacturing industries, over the period 1977-82. Equation (2.1) is
estimated using the non-production workers share of wage bill in each of the 32 industries; in order to
measure production transfer at the industry-level, the author replaces the denominator of (2.3) with
total industry employment23. As anticipated, results show that production transfer played almost no
role in explaining the economy-wide increase in the non-production workers share of wage bill: hence,
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had U.S. MNEs made no use of production transfer, wage inequality would have increased by roughly
the same amount. This result is strongly conrmed by Falzoni and Grasseni (2003) for Italy. The
authors use a panel of Italian manufacturing MNEs observed in 1993, 1995 and 1997 and conduct
their analysis on 89 NACE Rev. 3 industries. To this purpose, the proxy for production transfer in
(2.3) is aggregated up at the industry-level and skilled and unskilled workers are proxied by white and
blue collar employees. The data allow the authors to distinguish production transfer by region: in
particular, Falzoni and Grasseni separately consider developed economies, less developed economies
and CEECs. Results show no signicant e¤ect of production transfer to any of the three regions on
the skilled labor share of wage bill at the industry level.
Studies with a more detailed disaggregation of labor I turn now to answer the second ques-
tion: is the skilled / unskilled classication too restrictive? In principle, the answer is "yes". In
particular, two drawbacks may a¤ect studies using that classication. The rst is due to the fact that
the occupations falling in the two skill groups are generally characterized by signicant di¤erences in
level of education, vocational qualication and working experience. Therefore, treating the groups as
homogeneous may be misleading, because it implies aggregating occupations that di¤er signicantly
in exactly those characteristics that are most important to capture the skill level. Although the
use of alternative classications based on the level of educational attainment can somehow mitigate
the problem, nonetheless, workers with the same level of education usually di¤er from each other in
working experience and on-the-job qualication, and are typically employed in very heterogeneous
occupations. Hence, treating workers with the same level of educational attainment as homogeneous
may be misleading as well. Moreover, and this leads me to the second drawback, in order for aggre-
gation of workers with di¤erent skills to be consistent, the underlying production technology has to
satisfy very restrictive assumptions. In particular, either skilled and unskilled workers can be treated
as perfect substitutes or the production function is separable in the labor services provided by skilled
and unskilled workers. If these assumptions are violated, empirical results will be biased (Berndt and
Christensen, 1974; Blackorby et al., 1977; Denny and Fuss, 1977; Koebel, 2006). For these reasons, in
recent years, a new interest has arisen in studies employing ner disaggregations of labor. This interest
has been felt rst by labor economists (Fitzenberger, 1999; Mellander, 1999)24, but has recently been
expressed also by trade economists interested in studying the e¤ects of material o¤shoring on relative
labor demand. Recent studies have therefore adopted classications based on three or more levels
of education of the workforce (Falk and Koebel, 2001, 2002; Morrison and Siegel, 2001; Ekholm and
17
Hakkala, 2005; Hijzen et al., 2005).
The general approach used by this literature is similar to that presented in section 2.1.2. However,
now the short-run translog cost function of the representative rm depends on N > 2 variable inputs.
As a consequence, Shepards lemma yields a system of N share equations with the same form as (2.1).
Exploiting estimated parameters, labor demand elasticities to material o¤shoring can be derived as
"i;moss = i;moss=SHi, where i = 1; :::; N indexes labor inputs and i;moss is the coe¢ cient of moss
in the i-th share equation. If "i;moss < 0, material o¤shoring shifts relative labor demand away from
labor of type i25.
The main result from these studies is that material o¤shoring has mostly a¤ected workers with
low or medium levels of education, but exerted almost no e¤ect on the most skilled. These results are
fully consistent with those emerging from the use of dichotomous classications. Hence, although the
latter may in principle be too restrictive, in practice they seem to perform quite well.
Hijzen et al. (2005) use a panel of 50 U.K. manufacturing industries over the period 1982-96 and
distinguish labor in three categories: skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled26. Estimated elasticities show
that material o¤shoring exerts negative e¤ects only on the unskilled, thereby shifting relative labor
demand away from them and towards the other two groups. Exploiting results reported in Table 6 of
that study (pp. 871), a 10% increase in material o¤shoring leads to a 6.4% reduction in the wage bill
share of unskilled workers and to an analogous increase in the wage bill share of the other two groups.
Similar results are found by Ekholm and Hakkala (2005) in their study on 89 Swedish industries
between 1995 and 2000. Labor is disaggregated in three groups: workers with primary, secondary
and tertiary education. Results show that material o¤shoring shifts demand away from workers with
secondary education, but exerts no e¤ect on those with tertiary education. Estimated elasticities imply
that a 10% increase in narrow o¤shoring lowers demand for workers with secondary education by 4-
6%27. The only relevant exception to this pattern is the e¤ect of o¤shoring to low-income countries:
the authors, in fact, nd that it exerts some positive e¤ect on relative demand for workers with tertiary
education.
There are two additional studies that can be included in this section, although they depart somehow
from the methodological framework previously discussed. The main departure stays in the use of
alternative exible functional forms for the short-run cost function of the rm. These studies, however,
are also based on the derivation of labor demand elasticities from the full set of demand equations,
and therefore can logically be included herein.
Morrison and Siegel (2001) use a Generalized Leontief short-run cost function instead of a translog
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and disaggregate labor in four groups: workers with no high-school diploma, workers with high-school
diploma, workers with some college but without college degree, workers with a college degree. The
panel includes 450 U.S. manufacturing industries between 1959 and 1989; material o¤shoring is proxied
with the ratio of imports to output. In line with previous studies, estimated elasticities show that
increasing o¤shoring reduces the demand for workers without any college education (the two least
skilled groups), but exerts almost no e¤ect on those with at least some college degree.
Finally, Falk and Koebel (2002) use a Generalized Box-Cox cost function and a panel of 26 German
manufacturing industries between 1978 and 1990. Labor is disaggregated in three skill groups: high-
skilled workers (those with a university or polytechnical degree), medium-skilled workers (those with
a vocational degree) and low-skilled workers (those without any formal qualication). Consistently
with previous results, the authors nd evidence of only weak negative e¤ects of material o¤shoring
on relative labor demand for the low-skilled; by contrast, also in this case, the high-skilled are not
a¤ected by material o¤shoring28.
2.1.4. A few words about SBTC
Among the principal explanations for the outward shift in relative skilled labor demand occurred
since the early 1980s in most developed countries, the literature has indicated SBTC, along with
material o¤shoring. Indeed, many studies exist that have tested empirically the e¤ect of SBTC in a
framework similar to that described in section 2.1.2; these studies are recalled in section 2.1.1. While
such contributions have focused almost exclusively on SBTC, the widely recognized importance of
the di¤usion of new technologies in explaining the outward shift in relative labor demand has made
necessary also for the studies on material o¤shoring to at least control for SBTC in the empirical
analysis. Hence, almost all previous contributions on material o¤shoring have included a proxy for
SBTC in the estimating equation (2.1).
How is SBTC measured? As it was the case for material o¤shoring, also for SBTC it is possible to
identify an ideal measure; also in this case, however, studies have often been prevented from using such
a measure, and have thus been forced to rely on alternative proxies. Following Berndt and Morrison
(1995) and Feenstra and Hanson (1999), the ideal measure of SBTC is represented by the share of
high-tech capital services on total capital services. Computation of this share requires to measure the
rate of return on high-tech capital, which can, in turn, be distinguished in ex-post and ex-ante: the
di¤erence between the two is that the ex-post rate of return includes also the capital gains on high-tech
capital, whereas the ex-ante rate excludes them; as such, the ex-ante rate of return represents a safer
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measure of the return on high-tech capital, because it does not consider gains due to price changes.
Under a no-arbitrage condition, which states that individuals must be indi¤erent between investing
in productive capital and in nancial assets, the rate of return on productive capital must be equal
to the prevailing interest rate. Hence, by multiplying the stock of high-tech capital with a measure
of the interest rate (usually the rate on Baa bonds), one obtains a proxy for the rate of return on
high-tech capital; since this proxy does not account for capital gains, it represents an ex-ante measure.
Finally, by dividing this measure with the overall stock of capital, one obtains a proxy for the share of
high-tech capital services on total capital services. A similar computation can be used to obtain the
share expressed in ex-post terms; Hall and Jorgenson (1969) provide a useful formula to compute the
ex-post price of capital, which accounts also for capital gains.
The ex-ante and ex-post measures of SBTC have generally been used in studies on the U.S.
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1999); due to the lack of data on the stock of high-tech capital, studies on other
countries have instead relied on di¤erent proxies for SBTC: the most widely adopted are expenditure
in R&D (or the share of R&D in total sales) and the fraction of workers employed in either R&D or
patenting activities.
How important are the e¤ects of SBTC on relative skilled labor demand, as compared with those
of material o¤shoring? Although I will not review all the results from previous studies - because
this would take me away from the main focus of the paper - evidence suggests that SBTC has been
as important as material o¤shoring. For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) show that SBTC
has contributed to about 35% of the observed increase in the skilled labor share of wage bill in the
U.S. between 1972 and 1994, versus a 32%-53% contribution of broad material o¤shoring and a 13%-
23% contribution of narrow material o¤shoring. Similarly, in the case of Sweden, Anderton et al.
(2002b) nd that "technological change [...] was the dominant factor, accounting for well over half
of the average increase in wage and employment inequality" (pp. 647). These results are generally
conrmed by most of the studies surveyed before.
2.2. E¤ects on labor demand elasticities and short-run employment dynamics
Studies in previous section are based on the idea that, in the long-run, material o¤shoring pushes
developed countries to a new labor market equilibrium, characterized by higher relative skilled wages
and employment; this implies a deterioration in the economic fortunes of the unskilled relative to the
skilled. Nevertheless, material o¤shoring may in principle hurt the unskilled through at least other
two channels. First, even without shifting relative labor demand signicantly, material o¤shoring
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may make unskilled labor demand more elastic, by easing the possibility for domestic rms to replace
national unskilled workers with cheaper foreign labor. A more elastic labor demand implies higher
volatility of employment and wages, and lower bargaining power for the employees. What is crucial
about this e¤ect is that it may work even if the actual volume of o¤shoring is low, provided that
the threat of future o¤shoring is high. This mechanism has rst been described by Rodrik (1997);
therefore, I will refer to it as Rodriks hypothesis. Second, o¤shoring can signicantly hurt the unskilled
also in the short-run, by exposing them to the risk of being displaced and to become unemployed or
to be reemployed in lower-wage jobs. From the workersviewpoint, such a short-run e¤ect is probably
more relevant than the long-run impact on wage inequality. Empirical research on both topics is still
very limited and additional contributions are surely needed to draw denite conclusions. Based on
existing results, however, both e¤ects appear weak.
I start from the Rodriks hypothesis. Existing studies focus on the U.S. and reach conicting
conclusions about the validity of the hypothesis. The empirical framework is based on a two-step
procedure. In the rst step, the conditional (on output) labor demand elasticities are estimated from
the following labor demand equation:
lnLkijt =
X
k=S;U
k1jt lnw
k
ijt + 2 lnYijt + "ijt (2.4)
where L is employment and Y output; t indexes time, j industries, i rms (or industries with
a ner level of aggregation than those indexed by j), k skilled (S) and unskilled (U) workers; "ijt
is an idiosyncratic error term. Own-wage conditional labor demand elasticities are given by kjt =
@ lnLkijt=@ lnw
k
ijt = 
k
1jt; as evident, these elasticities can be left free to vary across industries j and
over time. In the second step, estimated elasticities are regressed on material o¤shoring [measured as
in (2.2)] and a vector of control variables Xjt:
kjt =  mossjt +Xjt0 + !jt
where !jt is the idiosyncratic error term at the second stage and  is a vector of parameters to be
estimated. Since kjt < 0 for theoretical consistency (the labor demand function slopes downward), if
 < 0 material o¤shoring makes labor demand for input k more elastic.
Studies using industry-level data found little or no support for the Rodriks hypothesis. Slaughter
(2001) uses data on 450 4-digit U.S. manufacturing industries (i) observed between 1958 and 1991 to
estimate labor demand elasticities for skilled (non-production) and unskilled (production) workers in
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eight aggregated sectors (j). Over time, only unskilled labor demand has become more elastic, which
is consistent with the idea that material o¤shoring poses stronger threats to the unskilled; this has
happened in ve out of eight industries. Nevertheless, results from the second estimation step show that
o¤shoring (broad and narrow) played almost no role in explaining the rise in unskilled labor demand
elasticities: when time controls are included in the second-stage regression, in fact, the o¤shoring
coe¢ cients lose signicance29. The main explanation for the dominance of the time e¤ects is probably
statistical: the o¤shoring variables, like most of the remaining trade and technology controls used
by the author, do not show signicant cross-sectional variation, and therefore time dummies capture
all the e¤ect of these variables on labor demand elasticities30. This problem is addressed by Senses
(2006) using rm-level data on roughly 25,000 U.S. manufacturing rms between 1977 and 199531.
Thanks to these data, the author is able to estimate labor demand elasticities for the whole set of
2-digit manufacturing industries, thereby allowing for su¢ cient cross-sectional variation. Results show
that, on average, unskilled labor demand has become more elastic during the 1980s, and especially so
between 1977 and 1992. This trend has been driven by those industries that resorted more heavily
to o¤shoring; no signicant pattern emerges instead for the remaining sectors. Consistently, second-
step estimates show that material o¤shoring did play some role in making unskilled labor demand
more elastic. The author shows that this result is robust to the use of broad and narrow measures
of o¤shoring, as well as to the adoption of alternative proxies32. More importantly, the result is not
a¤ected by the inclusion of time controls; hence, when su¢ cient cross-sectional variation is allowed
for, some e¤ect of material o¤shoring on unskilled labor demand elasticity emerges, supporting the
Rodriks hypothesis.
I now turn to the short-run employment dynamics (adjustment costs) induced by material o¤-
shoring. Also in this case, the fear of negative e¤ects on the unskilled has insofar found only partial
support. The number of studies on the topic is limited: in fact, while several contributions have
analyzed the short-run adjustment costs to trade in nal goods and real exchange rate uctuations
(Grossman, 1987; Revenga, 1992; Burgess and Knetter, 1998; Goldberg et al., 1999; Klein et al., 2002,
2003a,b; Kletzer, 1998, 2001 and 2002), studies focusing specically on material o¤shoring are very
scant. Egger et al. (2006) use an employee-level panel dataset consisting of roughly 30,000 Austrian
male individuals observed between 1988 and 2001. The possibility of tracking each individual over time
allows the authors to compute a full transition probability matrix, with cells containing the fraction
of workers moving each year among six di¤erent employment states: unemployed, out of labor force,
employed in comparative advantage manufacturing industries, employed in comparative disadvantage
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manufacturing industries; employed in the service sector and employed in the trade sector. Material
o¤shoring is proxied by the imports share of intermediate goods. One main limitation of the analysis
is that it is based on aggregate employment, while using data on unskilled workers would probably be
more suited to the purpose. Estimation of the full transition probability matrix through a dynamic
multinomial logit model with xed e¤ects shows a clear pattern of short-run employment dynamics
induced by material o¤shoring: namely, the latter reduces the probability for workers to remain em-
ployed in comparative disadvantage industries; moreover, it reduces the probability for workers to
move to such industries when unemployed or out of the labor force in the previous year. These results
suggest that in the short-run, because of material o¤shoring, workers employed in sectors exposed
to foreign competition may face higher risk of being displaced and either becoming unemployed or
being reemployed in low-paid jobs. But, how big is the number of workers displaced by material
o¤shoring? Do these workers really su¤er from long-term unemployment and signicant wage losses?
Based on existing evidence, the concerns related to similar questions seem exaggerated: the number
of jobs destroyed by material o¤shoring represents in fact only a small fraction of the total number of
jobs lost in a given year; moreover, although material o¤shoring raises the risk of unemployment, the
magnitude of this e¤ect is limited. Munch (2005) uses a panel of Danish individual manufacturing
employees between 1992 and 2001 and studies whether material o¤shoring - measured as in (2.2) -
raises the probability for a given worker to have her job destroyed. By estimating a duration model
with duration dependence and worker heterogeneity, the author nds that, although positive, the ef-
fects of material o¤shoring are small in magnitude. Precisely, in the worst scenario, a 1% increase in
broad material o¤shoring raises the probability of job destruction by 0.48%; this implies that material
o¤shoring accounts for 9% of the jobs destroyed in manufacturing in a given year and for 2% of the
jobs destroyed in the economy as a whole. As to the risk of unemployment, material o¤shoring is found
to increase it only for the unskilled and by a limited amount: a 1% increase in material o¤shoring
raises the probability of being unemployed by 1.3% for workers with basic education.
3. Service O¤shoring
I now turn to review the available literature on service o¤shoring. Research has mostly focused on
the U.S. and the U.K., where service o¤shoring has been growing rapidly in recent years. Two issues
have insofar received attention: the e¤ects of service o¤shoring on aggregate labor demand and total
employment and the e¤ects of service o¤shoring on relative labor demand for skilled white-collar
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workers.
3.1. E¤ects on aggregate labor demand and total employment
As I mentioned in the introduction, the rst concern that emerged around service o¤shoring is that
it will negatively a¤ect total labor demand in developed countries, leading to substantial job losses.
For instance, recent reports by Forrester Research (2002, 2004a,b) estimate that about 1 million U.S.
jobs would have been o¤shored by the end of 2005 and that a total of 3.4 million jobs would be moved
abroad by the end of 2015; another report by Goldman Sachs calculates that, between 2000 and 2004,
10,000 jobs per months have been moved overseas by U.S. rms, and that 15,000 to 30,000 jobs per
month will be o¤shored in the near future (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). These numbers are denitely
large in absolute value. But, are they large enough to support the "fear of service o¤shoring"? (Amiti
and Wei, 2005a). Existing studies suggest that the most correct answer to this question is "probably
no". Some authors have in fact argued that, although sizeable in absolute terms, these numbers are
small in relative terms. Specically, they represent just a small fraction of the overall job turnover
occurring each month in the U.S. labor market, which amounts to more than two million jobs (Baily
and Farrell, 2004). Likewise, according to Mankiw and Swagel (2006), these numbers "seem modest
compared to the more than 160 million jobs projected [...] to exist by 2015, and small even compared
to the 35 million net new jobs gained over the past decade".
Not only are existing projections of future job losses due to service o¤shoring tiny relative to the
usual job ows occurring in the U.S.; these projections are also probably overstated. On one hand, in
fact, evidence based on Mass Layo¤s Statistics for the U.S. suggests that the role of service o¤shoring
in explaining recent layo¤ episodes is negligible: according to Rishi and Saxena (2004), the fraction
of laid o¤ workers due to o¤shoring in the rst quarter of 2004 was less then 2.5% of the total. The
bulk of these layo¤ episodes and, in general, of the recent labor market weakness in the U.S. has
instead been caused by the dot-com bust and the macroeconomic downturn of the late 1990s (Baily
and Lawrence, 2004; Schultze, 2004). On the other hand, econometric evidence has shown that the
impact of service o¤shoring on labor demand in developed countries has up to now been negligible,
and, in some cases, even positive. Amiti and Wei (2005b) study the relationship between service
o¤shoring and labor demand in the U.S. manufacturing between 1992 and 2000; the analysis is carried
out on two samples, consisting of 450 and 96 industries respectively. The authors measure service
o¤shoring as in (2.2), but replacing imports of intermediate inputs with imports of private services33.
Results from the estimation of a log-linear demand equation show only a weak negative e¤ect of service
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o¤shoring on labor demand in the sample of 450 sectors; this e¤ect disappears, however, in the more
aggregated sample of 96 industries. The authors therefore argue that "there is su¢ cient growth in
demand in other industries within these broadly dened classications to o¤set any negative e¤ect [of
service o¤shoring]" (Amiti and Wei, 2005b, pp. 29). Another study by Amiti and Wei (2005a) on
the U.K. conrms these predictions: focusing on 69 manufacturing industries between 1992 and 2001
and employing the same methodology and the same measure of service o¤shoring34, the authors nd
that service o¤shoring exerts no negative e¤ect on labor demand; rather, in some specications, the
o¤shoring coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant. Finally, Gorg and Hanley (2005), using
a panel of Irish electronics rms between 1990 and 1995, nd that service o¤shoring exerts at most
small negative e¤ects on labor demand.
Why does service o¤shoring exert at most limited negative e¤ects on labor demand? There are at
least two explanations. First, although rapidly increasing, service o¤shoring is still too limited to a¤ect
labor demand signicantly. Second, while possibly causing some jobs to be moved overseas, service
o¤shoring also contributes to create new jobs at home. This happens through at least three channels.
1) Service o¤shoring allows for a more e¢ cient allocation of activities across national borders; therefore,
rms o¤shore the least productive activities and focus on those they can carry out more e¢ ciently
(Deardor¤, 2005; Antras et al., 2006a; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a,b). As a result, rms
productivity increases (Heshmati, 2003; Olsen, 2006; Amiti and Wei, 2006), average costs fall and rms
become more competitive by reducing their average product prices; this, in turn, stimulates additional
demand for the rmsproducts and, through a scale e¤ect, raises domestic employment35. 2) Service
jobs created abroad stimulate increasing demand for goods and services produced at home, either
by the o¤shoring industry or by other sectors: hence, service o¤shoring creates new opportunities at
home, and through this channel, boosts domestic employment (Amiti and Wei, 2005b). 3) Service
o¤shoring may make nancially viable projects that would otherwise be unfeasible for the domestic
rms, due to their overall level of costs; starting the project, in turn, creates domestic jobs that would
not exist otherwise (Bhagwati et al., 2004).
Existing evidence has therefore shown that the rst concern about service o¤shoring is exaggerated.
Nevertheless, this is not enough to relieve all anxieties. Very recently, in fact, people started being
concerned that service o¤shoring will exert downward pressures on skilled labor demand and threat
the whole process of human capital accumulation in developed countries. Is this concern supported
by theory and empirical evidence? This will be the topic of next section.
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3.2. Are the white-collars at risk of service o¤shoring?
Service tasks are on average more skill-intensive than productive activities. Hence, unlike material
o¤shoring, service o¤shoring leads to the relocation of skilled activities abroad. For this reason,
service o¤shoring has recently been blamed to reduce the incentives to accumulate education and
on-the-job qualication and eventually hinder the whole process of human capital accumulation in
developed countries36. Existing results show, however, that also this second concern is likely to
be exaggerated. For theoretical and empirical convenience, it is better to reformulate the issue in
terms of the redistributional e¤ects of service o¤shoring. Besides being on average more skilled than
productive activities, service tasks are usually performed by white-collar workers. Some of these tasks
are performed by low-skilled white-collars (e.g. call center operations), whereas others require high-
skilled white-collars (e.g. engineering and managerial consulting). In order for service o¤shoring to
threaten human capital accumulation in developed countries, it is the set of high-skilled service tasks
that has to be jeopardized by service o¤shoring. Hence, the problem can be analyzed by studying
whether service o¤shoring shifts relative labor demand away from high-skilled white-collar workers.
3.2.1. A bit of theory
Despite the empirical focus of this paper, the novelty of service o¤shoring makes some theory necessary
to understand its e¤ects on relative labor demand. Existing contributions can be divided in two
streams: a traditional approach based on standard trade theory and a new approach exploiting the
theory of rms organizations and hierarchies and emphasizing the nature of service o¤shoring as "trade
in tasks". The two approaches yield similar predictions about the welfare and redistributional e¤ects
of service o¤shoring.
I will spend just a few words on the welfare e¤ects. In brief, both approaches predict that, under
fairly reasonable assumptions, service o¤shoring increases aggregate welfare at home. This happens
because service o¤shoring allows for a more e¢ cient allocation of activities across national borders
and gives countries the possibility of specializing in the tasks they perform more e¢ ciently, thereby
raising overall domestic productivity [see Bhagwati et al. (2004), Deardor¤ (2005) and Markusen
(2005) for contributions belonging to the rst approach, and Antras et al. (2006a) and Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,b) for contributions belonging to the second approach]37.
The discussion of the redistributional e¤ects is slightly more complicated, because the two streams
of literature approach the issue from very di¤erent starting points. Nonetheless, both streams con-
verge to similar conclusions. What really matters to understand the redistributional e¤ects of service
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o¤shoring is which service tasks rms nd more convenient to o¤shore; in particular, the nal e¤ect
will depend on the skill intensity of such tasks. According to the rst stream of literature, service
o¤shoring will lead developed countries to specialize in high-skill intensive service tasks, in line with
the standard law of comparative advantages (Treer, 2005a,b). Hence, this approach predicts that
service o¤shoring will shift relative labor demand in favor of the most skilled white-collar workers.
The second stream of literature, instead, pays no attention at the skill-intensity of the tasks. What
really matters according to this approach is that tasks show feature that make their services easily
tradable; if this is so, tasks will be exposed to the risk of being o¤shored, regardless of their skill-
intensity (Levy and Murname, 2004; Blinder, 2005; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a,b). As a
consequence, following this approach might make less simple to predict the redistributional e¤ects of
service o¤shoring, because in principle there is no clear relationship between the tradability of a task
and its skill intensity. Nevertheless, in practice, the tasks that show tradability features are generally
highly routinized and low skill-intensive. For example, Garner (2004) suggests that service activities
are more likely to be o¤shored if they are: 1) labor intensive - labor represents a high fraction of total
costs; 2) information based - the output of the task can be delivered electronically across national
borders; 3) codiable - the task can be reduced to a set of simple rules and routinized instructions;
4) high-transparency - the information to be exchanged between the o¤shoring rm and the related
party overseas is clear and easy to measure and to verify. Similar features have been suggested also
by Autor et al. (2003), Bardhan ad Kroll (2003), Levy and Murname (2004), Blinder (2005), Jensen
and Kletzer (2005), Kroll (2005), van Welsum and Reif (2005) and van Welsum and Vickery (2005).
Evidently, tasks with these attributes are generally performed by low-skilled white-collar workers:
think, for instance, of call center operations, accounting and bookkeeping procedures, bill processing,
cost estimation and many back o¢ ce activities38; but think also of more recent examples of service
o¤shoring like X-ray screening and medical case history transcription. As a consequence, the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from the second approach on the redistributional e¤ects of service o¤shoring
are similar to those emerging from the rst approach: in developed countries, service o¤shoring will
shift relative labor demand in favor of high-skilled white-collar workers (Antras et al., 2006b).
Are theoretical predictions supported by the data? Although research is still limited, the answer
is "probably yes".
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3.2.2. What do the data tell us?
To the best of my knowledge, only two econometric studies have insofar analyzed the e¤ects of service
o¤shoring on the white-collars: Crinò (2006) and Liu and Treer (2006); both focus on the U.S.. The
main conclusions of these studies can be summarized as follows. The increasing exposure of the U.S.
economy to service o¤shoring has caused neither signicant wage losses nor sizeable increases in job
insecurity for national high-skilled white-collar workers; rather, service o¤shoring has induced national
rms to shift the composition of their labor demand exactly in favor of these workers. Hence, theoret-
ical predictions seem supported by available empirical results: service o¤shoring is pushing the U.S.
to shift abroad low skill-intensive service tasks, while specializing in more complex service activities,
that are performed by high-skilled white-collar employees. Also empirical evidence, therefore, seems
at odds with the fear that service o¤shoring will endanger human capital accumulation in developed
countries in the near future.
Liu and Treer (2006) study whether service o¤shoring increases the risk of wage losses and job
insecurity for U.S. white-collar workers. Service o¤shoring is measured as imports of other private
services from China and India39. The use of Current Population Survey data between 1996 and 2004
allows the authors to track individual workers over time and to identify three channels through which
service o¤shoring may negatively a¤ect U.S. white-collar employees: 1) by inducing losses of labor
income; 2) by increasing the probability of industry switching; 3) by increasing the probability of
occupation switching40. The last two channels represent ways in which service o¤shoring may raise
job insecurity; moreover, since human capital typically is industry- or occupation-specic, they also
represent ways in which service o¤shoring may threaten domestic human capital. Separate regressions
are run for high-school graduates and college graduates, as well as for skilled and unskilled white-
collars41. Fixed e¤ects results show that for neither of the four groups has service o¤shoring to China
and India caused signicant losses of labor income. Turning to the probability of switching industry
and occupations, probit results show only a very small rise in the likelihood of changing sector/job for
U.S. white-collars as a result of service o¤shoring. In particular, a 10 percent increase in service imports
from China and India raises the probability of switching industry by 0.25 percent for college graduates,
by 0.32 percent for high-school graduates, by 0.27 percent for skilled white-collars and by 0.26 percent
for unskilled white-collars (Liu and Treer, 2006, Table 6, p.47). The same increase in service imports
from China and India raises the probability of switching occupation by 0.22 percent for both college
graduates and high-school graduates and by 0.24 percent for skilled white-collars, without producing
any signicant e¤ect on unskilled white-collar workers (Liu and Treer, 2006, Table 7, p.48). Hence,
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service o¤shoring does not entail any loss of labor income for U.S. white-collars; moreover, although
statistically signicant, its e¤ects on job insecurity are economically very modest42.
Crinò (2006) studies how U.S. rms have changed the structure of labor demand in recent years, as
a result of increasing service o¤shoring. The author uses a panel of 135 U.S. manufacturing industries
covering the period 1997-2002 and proxies service o¤shoring with the share of imported services on
total non-energy inputs purchases, as in Amiti and Wei (2005a,b, 2006)43. The use of the Occupa-
tional Employment Statistics of the BEA allows Crinò to distinguish each industrys employment into
111 minor occupations, out of which 58 are white-collar; these minor occupations are then aggregated
up into 13 broader groups of workers, performing similar tasks: for example, minor managerial oc-
cupations are grouped into a broader category called "Managers". Thanks to a two-stage translog
model, the author is able to estimate the e¤ects of service o¤shoring on relative labor demand both
for the minor occupations belonging to each major occupational group and for the major groups
themselves. Results unambiguously show that service o¤shoring raises relative labor demand for high-
skilled white-collar occupations within each group, as well as relative labor demand for each and every
major group. Hence, service o¤shoring seems to stimulate, rather than threatening, the process of
human capital accumulation in the U.S., by inducing rms to specialize in complex service activities
requiring high-skilled white-collar workers.
The main conclusions emerging from the econometric studies are supported by a large body of
stylized facts and projections about past and future trends in U.S. white-collar employment. This
stream of literature shows, in fact, that the composition of white-collar employment has been - and
will increasingly be - shifting in favor of high-skilled, high-paid, occupations. According to Forrester
Research (2002, 2004a,b), 57 percent of the expected job losses in at-risk white-collar occupations by
2015 will occur in "O¢ ce and Administrative Support" and "Sales and Related Occupations". Workers
in these jobs are the least skilled white-collars (Crinò, 2006) and receive wages signicantly below the
national average (Kirkegaard, 2004). Instead, with the only exceptions of the groups "Managers"
and "Computer and Mathematical Occupations," the remaining white-collar groups have added jobs
between 1999 and 2002 (Mann, 2003). Moreover, the overall decline in the number of employees in
"Computer and Mathematical Occupations" has been driven by the contraction in the number of
workers in low-wage occupations, while those in high-paid occupations have increased (Kirkegaard,
2004). Finally, Jensen and Kletzer (2005) show that the occupations at the lowest end of the skill
distribution experienced negative employment growth rates between 1998 and 2002, a period in which
the remaining occupations beneted instead from positive growth rates of employment. These trends
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seem to be conrmed also at the level of the single Metropolitan Area: in particular, Kroll (2005)
shows that the San Jose Metro Area (Silicon Valley) has been progressively specializing in high-end IT
occupations, while loosing the low-end ones; moreover, the denition of high-end occupations has been
shifting up, in the sense that jobs previously considered skilled have been progressively standardized
and routinized and are now performed by low-skilled white-collars.
4.Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)
In Part 1 and 2, I reviewed the labor market e¤ects of material and service o¤shoring. The literature
surveyed therein pays little or no attention at the e¤ects of outward FDI and MNEs activities in
foreign markets, the only exception being the limited set of studies on production transfer within
MNEs. The reason - as stated in the introduction - is that MNEs activities are not necessarily linked
to o¤shoring. Indeed, MNEs very often enter foreign countries to serve local markets, rather than to
exploit cross-country cost di¤erentials. This notwithstanding, the e¤ects of foreign activities of MNEs
on the domestic labor market may be potentially strong and have actually been the object of harsh
debates between advocates and opponents of globalization in recent years. Therefore, I will devote
this section to a separate discussion of these e¤ects.
The bulk of existing literature has focused on a specic issue: what are the consequences for
domestic labor demand of the possibility for MNEs to adjust their employment choices at home (in
the parent) in response to changes in foreign (a¢ liates) wages relative to domestic wages? The e¤ect is
not predictable a priori, but depends on the relationship between foreign and domestic employment: if
the two types of labor are substitutes, domestic employment will decrease as foreign wages declines; by
contrast, if domestic and foreign labor are complements, a decline in foreign wages relative to domestic
wages will lead MNEs to raise domestic employment. The link between the nature of this relationship
and that of FDI is not clear-cut. Without any ambition of being exhaustive, however, I can attempt
to build the following classication. Under vertical FDI, both complementarity and substitutability
may occur. If the activities transferred abroad require upstream or downstream tasks to be performed
by the parent, domestic and foreign employment will be complement and domestic employment will
expand as foreign employment increases. However, if foreign activities replace domestic operations,
domestic and foreign employment will be substitutes; moreover, because vertical FDI are generally
meant to exploit cost advantages abroad, substitutability will mainly work through the replacement
of domestic labor with foreign unskilled labor. Under horizontal FDI, substitutability is more likely
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to occur, because foreign production replaces domestic production and exports.
I should note that a limited number of studies have focused on a di¤erent, though related, topic: the
e¤ect of an expansion in the volume of foreign a¢ liates activities on parent employment. Briey, MNEs
may adjust domestic employment not only in response to changes in relative wages across countries,
but also in response to changes in the volume of production and sales carried out by a¢ liates in
foreign markets. Also in this case the e¤ect is unpredictable a priori and existing empirical studies
have insofar reached conicting conclusions (Blomstrom et al., 1997; Lipsey, 1997; Lipsey et al., 2000;
Desay et al., 2005). Given the limited extent of this second stream of literature, I will focus only on
the rst set of studies; accurate surveys of contributions belonging to the second set can be found in
Blomstrom and Kokko (2000) and in Barba Navaretti, Venables et al. (2004, chp. 9).
4.1. The framework
Suppose that MNEs are multiplant rms, with an overall cost function depending on total output
(YMNE) and on the wages paid by the parent (wp) and by the a¢ liates in N locations (wi, with
i = 1; :::; N):
CMNE = f(wp; w1; :::; wi; :::; wN ; YMNE) (4.1)
Optimal labor demand by parent (conditional on YMNE) can then be derived through Shepards
lemma applied to (4.1):
@CMNE(wp; w1; :::; wi; :::; wN ; YMNE)
@wp
= Lp(wp; w1; :::; wi; :::; wN ; YMNE) (4.2)
Finally, (4.2) can be used to derive cross-wage elasticities of parent labor demand to wages in the
a¢ liates as:
"Lp;wi =
@ lnLp(wp; w1; :::; wi; :::; wN ; YMNE)
@ lnwi
(4.3)
Then, if "Lp;wi > 0, parent and a¢ liate employment in location i are substitutes; instead, if
"Lp;wi < 0, the two labor inputs are complements.
Assuming a log-linear specication for (4.2), the estimating equation becomes:
lnLp = + p lnwp +
NX
i=1
i lnwi + Y lnYMNE (4.4)
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and "Lp;wi = i.
Alternatively, assuming a translog specication for (4.1), Shepards lemma yields a full set of
wage-share equations of the form:
SHp = p + pp lnwp +
NX
i=1
pi lnwi + #pY lnYMNE
SH1 = 1 + 1p lnwp +
NX
i=1
1i lnwi + #1Y lnYMNE
:
:
SHN = N + Np lnwp +
NX
i=1
Ni lnwi + #NY lnYMNE (4.5)
where SHp is the share of parent employment in total MNEs cost, while SHi is the cost share of
labor in a¢ liates located in i. Standard translog results yields the following formula for the cross-wage
elasticities of parent labor demand:
"Lp ;wi =
pi + SHp  SHi
SHi
(4.6)
Notice that the translog approach allows also easy derivation of cross-wage elasticities of a¢ liates
employment in the generic location i to a change in wages in location j. Indeed, studies using this
approach have derived the full matrix of cross-wage elasticities, and not only those related to labor in
the parent. However, since the focus of this paper is on the domestic labor market e¤ects of o¤shoring
and MNEs, I will mostly focus attention on "Lp ;wi
44.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. United States
The bulk of existing evidence is on the U.S.. The main result is that there is only weak evidence
of substitutability between domestic and foreign labor. If any, substitutability is stronger with labor
in a¢ liates located in other high-income countries in the Eastern hemisphere (e.g. Europe): this is
consistent with FDI to these countries being mainly horizontal and aimed to serve local markets, by
avoiding trade barriers and transportation costs (Brainard, 1997). Although existent, substitutability
is instead weaker with respect to labor in low-income a¢ liates and decreasing in a¢ liates distance
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from the parent. Moreover, in this case, substitutability seems to emerge because parent employment
is substituted for with foreign unskilled labor; this is consistent with a vertical nature of FDI to low-
income countries and with MNEs expansion in these economies being mainly aimed to exploit cost
advantages in unskilled labor-intensive productions. Finally, the relationship is likely to switch into
complementarity when moving from the short to the long run, due to adjustment costs in achieving the
optimal level of employment in foreign locations. These adjustment costs mainly depend on the fact
that MNEs have to search and train their foreign labor force: usually, the more di¤erent the foreign
country is in terms of development, the slower the adjustment in foreign employment is towards the
optimal level.
Slaughter (1995) applies the translog approach in (4.5) to data on U.S. parents and their a¢ liates
in 32 industries between 1977 and 1989. The author does not disaggregate a¢ liates either according
to the level of development or according to the geographic position of foreign countries; as a result, he
estimates only the cross-wage elasticity between parent employment and overall a¢ liates employment.
However, the author does make the distinction between short- and log-run adjustments of parent labor
demand, by estimating two di¤erent versions of (4.5): the short-run version assumes that a¢ liates and
parent capital be xed at some pre-existing level, so that MNEs choose only the optimal labor demand
at home and abroad; the long-run version, instead, treats both types of capital as variable, so that
MNEs choose not only the optimal labor demand at home and abroad, but also the optimal demand
for capital in both locations. Results from the short-run model show that labor at home and abroad
are substitutes in the short-run: the estimated cross-wage elasticity is in fact signicantly positive and
ranges between 0.045 and 0.113, depending on whether all a¢ liates, or only majority-owned a¢ liates,
are included in the regression. These gures imply that a 10% decline in a¢ liates wages reduces parent
employment by only 0.45%-1.13% in the short-run; hence, substitutability is very weak. By contrast,
labor at home and abroad become complements in the long-run: the estimated cross-wage elasticity
is in fact signicantly negative and ranges between -0.040 and -0.139, implying that a 10% reduction
in a¢ liates wages increases parent employment by 0.4%-1.39%. Hence, substitutability is weak and
mainly concentrated in the short-run.
Do these results change if a¢ liates are distinguished according to host countries characteristics?
This question has been explicitly addressed by Brainard and Riker (1997), using the translog approach
in (4.5) and rm-level data on U.S. manufacturing MNEs between 1983 and 1992. A¢ liates are
distinguished according to both their geographic location (Western and Eastern hemisphere) and the
level of development of host countries (developed and developing); capital is treated as xed, and
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thus the analysis is limited to the short-run. Starting from the geographical classication of a¢ liates,
estimated cross-wage elasticities suggest the existence of substitutability between parent employment
and employment in both types of a¢ liates; the strength of this relationship, however, is small and
mostly driven by a¢ liates in the Eastern hemisphere, consistently with a horizontal nature of FDI to
those countries. Turning to the second classication, substitutability emerges again between parent
employment and employment in both types of a¢ liates. The relationship, however, is weak also in this
case. In order to further explore these results, the authors repeat the analysis by using a more detailed
classication of a¢ liates, in which the latter are distinguished over both dimensions at the same time.
Estimated cross-wage elasticities show that substitutability reaches the highest degree with respect
to high-income countries located in the Eastern hemisphere, followed by low-income countries in the
Western hemisphere. Hence, substitutability is mostly driven by a¢ liates in other high-wage locations;
in the case of a¢ liates in low-wage countries, substitutability generally requires a¢ liates to be close to
the parent, in order to minimize transportation costs, while exploiting foreign cost advantages. This
nding is conrmed by Harrison and McMillan (2006), using a longer panel of U.S. manufacturing
MNEs between 1971 and 1999. The authors employ both approaches in (4.4) and (4.5) and nd some
evidence of substitutability with respect to labor in low-income a¢ liates, in line with Brainard and
Riker (1997). The strength of the relationship, however, is very weak also in this case: elasticities
estimated from (4.4) show that a 10% decline in foreign a¢ liates wages in low-income countries leads
only to a 0.5% decline in parent employment; similarly, elasticities estimated from (4.5) show that
a 10% decline in foreign a¢ liates wages in low-income countries leads only to a 0.36% decline in
parent employment. Substitutability is mostly driven by production employment in foreign a¢ liates,
suggesting that U.S. parents do shift some of their labor intensive stages of production abroad to
exploit cost advantages in low-wage foreign locations.
One could argue that these ndings mask di¤erent e¤ects on domestic workers, according to
their level of skills. Hanson et al. (2003) focus on this issue, using a rm-level panel dataset for
the period 1989-99 and the log-linear approach in (4.4). The authors carry out the analysis using
both total parent employment and parent R&D employment, which represents a proxy for domestic
skilled labor; moreover, they distinguish foreign employment into skilled and unskilled workers45. As
a result, equation (4.4) is estimated twice, once with total parent employment and once with R&D
employment as the dependent variable; each time, the specication includes the wage of skilled and
unskilled foreign workers among the regressors. Both versions of the model reveal, also in this case,
that substitutability between domestic and foreign employment is at most very weak. When estimated
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on the sub-period 1989-94, elasticities from the rst model show that only a¢ liates unskilled labor
substitutes for parent employment; a¢ liates skilled labor, instead, complements parent employment.
The size of both e¤ects is small: a 10% fall in a¢ liate unskilled wages lowers domestic employment
by 3%, while the same reduction in a¢ liate skilled wages raises it by 3%. Moreover, these results are
not robust to the choice of alternative sub-periods: when estimated on the sub-sample 1994-99, in
fact, all elasticities turn out to be insignicant. Turning to the second version of the model - i.e., that
with R&D employment as the regressand - results show no relationship at all between a¢ liates and
parent employment: estimated elasticities are always insignicant. This may suggest that demand
for skilled labor in the parent is less sensitive to relative wage considerations, because skilled labor
usually generates rm-wide competitive benets.
Lastly, Bruno and Falzoni (2003) contribute to this literature by deepening the analysis of the short-
and long-run relationship between parent and a¢ liates employment. As shown in Slaughter (1995),
the relationship may switch from the short- to the long-run. Bruno and Falzoni conrm this nding
by extending the adjustment cost model of Epstein and Denny (1983) to the MNEs and by testing its
predictions on data for parents and a¢ liates in 32 industries between 1982 and 1994. Adjustment costs
may be crucial in switching the sign of the relationship: in fact, MNEs usually encounter di¢ culties
in searching and training their foreign labor force, so that the adjustment process towards the desired
level of employment abroad may take time to be completed. After dividing a¢ liates in four regions
(Canada, Europe, Latin America and Rest of the World), the authors nd that adjustment costs do
matter in fact, especially for the relationship between parent employment and a¢ liates employment
in low-wage Latin American countries: while in the short-run substitutability prevails between the
two labor inputs, in the long-run the relationship reverses into complementarity. Adjustment costs
are instead a less severe problem in Europe: in this case, parent and a¢ liates employment are found
to be substitutes both in the short- and in the long-run, a nding which is again consistent with a
horizontal nature of U.S. FDI in Europe, as emphasized by previous studies.
4.2.2. Europe
Results on European MNEs are fairly consistent with those on the U.S.. The evidence reveals, also
in this case, only weak substitutability between parent and a¢ liates employment. This relationship
is mostly driven by a¢ liates in other European countries, in line with a horizontal nature of FDI
towards these economies. Recent fears of a negative e¤ect of FDI to the CEECs appear exaggerated:
if any, substitutability between parent and a¢ liates employment in Central and Eastern Europe is
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small; moreover, it seems to interest only those countries that are at the border with the CEECs.
Braconier and Ekholm (2000) apply the framework in (4.4) to a panel of 44 Swedish MNEs and
their 594 a¢ liates over 6 non contiguous years46, and nd evidence of substitutability only between
parent employment and a¢ liates employment in other high-income countries (EU, U.S., Canada, Japan
and Australia); no signicant relationship emerges instead with a¢ liates employment in low-income
economies. Moreover, the strength of the relationship is low, a 10% fall in high-income a¢ liates
wages leading only to a 8% reduction in parent employment. These ndings are largely conrmed
by Konings and Murphy (2006), for a panel of 1067 medium and large European MNEs over the
period 1993-98. The authors nd evidence of substitutability only between parent employment and
employment in North European a¢ liates, but no signicant relationship between parent employment
and employment in low-income European countries and in the CEECs. The strength of substitutability
is very low also in this case: estimated cross-wage elasticities suggest that a 10% reduction in a¢ liates
wages in Northern Europe causes only a 0.32% decline in parent employment.
Although above evidence suggests that employment in European parents faces only limited substi-
tution in favor of a¢ liates employment in other high-wage European economies, for specic countries,
substitutability between parent employment and employment in low-wage CEECs may also arise:
boundary countries like Germany have in fact seen their MNEs opening up several production plants
in the CEECs, with the main aim of exploiting the larger endowment of unskilled labor in these
economies, along with their close proximity to the parents. Hence, average results on the whole set
of European MNEs may be misleading if applied to such boundary countries. This is what emerges
from two recent studies by Becker et al. (2005) and Becker and Muendler (2006) on German MNEs.
Both studies nd that employment in German parents is linked by a substitutability relationship to
employment in CEECs a¢ liates. Using the translog approach in (4.5) and a cross-section of 463 Ger-
man MNEs in 2000, Becker et al. (2005) nd that a 10% reduction in CEECs a¢ liates wages leads to
a 0.9% reduction in parent employment. These results are conrmed by Becker and Muendler (2006)
for a panel of 1259 German MNEs observed between 1996 and 2001: a 10% decline in CEECs a¢ liates
wages lowers parent employment by 0.5%. Nonetheless, substitutability is much weaker with respect
to labor in the CEECs than with respect to labor in other European countries: in this latter case, a
10% fall in foreign wages reduces parent employment by a factor ranging from 1.4% (Becker et al.,
2005) to 3.6% (Becker and Muendler, 2006). Becker et al. (2005) compare results for Germany with
those for 98 Swedish MNEs observed in 1998. Findings are fairly similar: also in the case of Swedish
MNEs, the main evidence is substitutability between parent employment and employment in other
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European countries; some (much weaker) substitutability is found also with respect to labor in the
CEECs. This latter result is inconsistent with Braconier and Ekholm (2000), who nd no evidence of
substitutability between parent employment and employment in a¢ liates located in low-wage coun-
tries. The inconsistency probably depends on the use of di¤erent data - only a cross-section of MNEs
in 1998 - and di¤erent classications of foreign a¢ liates by geographic region.
5. Conclusions and lines for further research
In this paper, I reviewed existing empirical evidence on the e¤ects of o¤shoring and foreign expansion
of MNEs on the labor markets of developed countries. The main conclusions of the paper can be
summarized as follows:
 Material o¤shoring has been an important determinant of increasing wage inequality and relative
skilled employment during the 1980s. It mainly worked by reducing relative labor demand for
workers with the lowest level of skills. The role of production transfer within MNEs has been
limited, due to the limited fraction of total material o¤shoring occurring within the boundaries
of MNEs.
 The e¤ects of material o¤shoring on the elasticity of unskilled labor demand and on the risk of
job losses are small.
 Service o¤shoring produces at most very limited negative e¤ects on total employment and tends
to shift the composition of labor demand in favor of high-skilled white-collar occupations.
 MNEs tend to substitute domestic labor with foreign labor, but the relationship is weak; more-
over, substitutability is mainly driven by horizontal, market-seeking, FDI directed to other
high-wage economies.
Based on the existing empirical evidence, many of the concerns raised in recent years about the
detrimental e¤ects of o¤shoring and foreign expansion of MNEs seem exaggerated from an economists
viewpoint: while some workers in specic rms and industries may su¤er from o¤shoring and outward
FDI, at the economy level the e¤ects are modest. On the basis of these ndings, therefore, the most
e¤ective way for dealing with o¤shoring and outward FDI is not the imposition of obstacles and
barriers to restrict the access of rms to these internationalization strategies. Rather, in the short-
run, governments should develop appropriate wage insurance schemes directed to the a¤ected workers
and, in the long-run, promote e¤ective retraining programs aiming to facilitate and accelerate the
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transition of these workers towards domestic industries and jobs shielded from o¤shoring and FDI and
retained domestically (Kletzer and Litan, 2001; Blinder, 2005; Brainard and Litan, 2004; Brainard et
al., 2005).
Despite its richness, the existing literature leaves open some promising avenues for future research.
I would like to indicate three of them. First, within the broader topic of the short-run adjustment
costs to o¤shoring, it would be interesting to expand the understanding of its potential consequences
in terms of wage losses. Up to now, in fact, existing studies have shown that the costs of o¤shoring
in terms of higher risk of unemployment and job destruction are limited; yet, o¤shoring may impose
also di¤erent burdens to national employees, for instance, by forcing them to nd new jobs in lower-
wage occupations and industries after displacement. A clearer understanding of the existence and
magnitude of these costs is crucial to tailor the right policy interventions in favor of workers hurt by
o¤shoring. Second, some recent studies have suggested that o¤shoring may raise the volatility of labor
demand, due to the fact that rms tend to change their o¤shoring decisions over time in response to
changes in cost di¤erentials across countries (Bergin et al., 2006). Rising volatility of labor demand,
in turn, means higher job and wage insecurity for national workers, and, if detected in the data, would
require the appropriate policy measures to be dealt with. Third, turning to the MNE side of the
paper, the above studies have analyzed only the e¤ects produced by the expansion of already existing
foreign plants: this has been dened as intensive margin e¤ect of FDI (Becker and Muendler, 2006).
However, employment at home may respond also at the extensive margin, that is, when MNEs decide
to open up a new plant abroad. This is especially crucial nowadays, given the increasing importance
of outward FDI to countries like China, where Western MNEs were virtually absent until a decade
ago. Nonetheless, evidence on the extensive margin e¤ects of MNEs on domestic employment is still
scant: studies have in fact paid attention only at the extensive margin e¤ect of MNEs expansion on
employment in other a¢ liates, but not in the parents (Becker and Muendler, 2006).
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Notes
1This practice has been given several alternative denitions in the literature. See Feenstra and
Hanson (2003) for a survey. Moreover, while arbitraging over cost-di¤erentials is probably the main
reason behind o¤shoring, other forces may induce rms to resort to this practice: coeteris paribus,
improvements in communication and transportation technologies and in political and economic insti-
tutions in foreign countries represent other important determinants (see Spencer, 2005).
2Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004, 2006) and Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2004, 2005)
develop models explaining the determinants of the choice between o¤shoring based on arms lenght con-
tracts and o¤shoring based on vertical FDI. Feenstra and Spencer (2005) clarify the role of geographic
proximity in explaining the choice between specic-investment contracts and standard contracts based
on market transactions. Helpman (2006) provides an updated survey of theoretical contributions about
o¤shoring.
3Yet, when discussing o¤shoring, I will devote some time to review the limited number of studies
that have analyzed the specic case in which o¤shoring occurs within the boundaries of MNEs.
4Recent years have seen developing countries a¢ rming as origin of FDI (UNCTAD, 2006). I will
not focus on this issue herein, but concentrate just on FDI outows from, and foreign activities of
MNEs based in, developed countries.
5See section 2.1.2 for a discussion of measurement issues.
6A more comprehensive approach has been taken by Greenaway and Nelson (2001) and Anderton
et al. (2006), who focus however on the broader topic of globalization and labor market, without
deepening the analysis of o¤shoring and MNEs.
7Authors calculations based on NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database (Bartels-
man and Gray, 1996). Although not fully precise, the non-production/production workers denition
represents a good proxy for the skilled / unskilled classication (Berman et al., 1994).
8Studies based on factor-content analysis attribute a somewhat larger role to international trade.
Also in this case, however, the role of trade appears too limited as compared with the observed outward
shift in relative skilled labor demand (Wood, 1994, 1995; Sachs and Shatz, 1994).
9Formal theoretical models explaining these e¤ects can be found in Arndt (1997, 1999), Arndt and
Kierzkowski (2001), Egger and Egger (2001), Feenstra and Hanson (2003) and Kohler (2001, 2004).
10Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show that material o¤shoring can shift relative labor demand outward
also in the foreign country, through a similar e¤ect on the skill intensity of production.
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11Notice that equation (2.1) already imposes homogeneity and simmetry restrictions, as standard
in the translog case.
12Alternatively, IIIi can be normalized by using industrys output or value added.
13These results are supported by a recent study by Hijzen (2006), who uses mandated-wage re-
gressions, instead of wage-share regressions, to study the e¤ects of material o¤shoring. For a deep
discussion of mandated-wage regressions, see Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Slaughter (2000a).
14Hansson denes skilled and unskilled workers according to the educational attainment of employ-
ees: in particular, skilled workers are dened as those with post-secondary education, that is, with
more than 12 years of schooling.
15Skilled workers are dened as those with tertiary education; unskilled workers are dened as
those with either secondary or primary education. Results are robust to the use of the two di¤erent
denitions of unskilled labor.
16The authors classify as skilled those workers whose job requires either high or special qualication
level; the remaining workers are classied as unskilled.
17Other related studies on Austria nd similar results, despite the use of a di¤erent methodological
approach, based on mandate wage regressions (Egger et al., 2001).
18Indeed, according to Lorentowicz et al. (2005), Austrian o¤shoring to countries like Germany and
the U.S. involves skill-intensive activities, becuase Austria is relatively less endowed with skilled labor
than such countries. As a consequence, the measure of overall o¤shoring used by Lorentowicz et al.
(2005) is likely to be negatively correlated with relative skilled labor demand.
19The white / blue collar classication is used to identify skilled and unskilled workers.
20Among the determinants of production transfer, Hanson et al. (2005) nd low unskilled labor
costs and corporate taxes in the host country and close proximity between parents and a¢ liates.
21The authors also show that production transfer has increased the average wage paid by the parents,
which suggests that production transfer has changed the employment skill mix in the parents towards
the non-production workers.
22Skilled workers are dened as those with post-secondary education (more than 12 years of school-
ing).
23Actually, Slaughter constucts 5 di¤erent measures of production transfer: besides a¢ liates employ-
ment, the author uses wage bill, value added, capital stock and value of shipments back to the U.S.. In
order to be consistent with the measurement in (2.3), in the text I refer only to the employment-based
measure of production transfer; however, results are not a¤ected by the use of di¤erent proxies.
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24See also Hamermesh (1993) for a survey.
25"i;moss has usually been dened as labor demand elasticity to material o¤shoring. I will use
this denition too, altough it is imprecise. In fact, "i;moss represents only one component of such an
elasticity, whose full expression is given by i;moss = "i;moss+C;moss, where C;moss is the cost elasticity
to material o¤shoring. Nevertheless, since C;moss is neutral across inputs, the only term capturing
changes in factor intensity (and therefore changes in relative labor demand) is "i;moss. Therefore,
"i;moss can in fact be used to measure the compositional e¤ects of material o¤shoring, but must be
interpreted as measuring such e¤ects at given costs.
26The authors classify as skilled the following occupations: managers and administrators; profes-
sional occupations. Semi-skilled include: associate professional and technical occupations; clerical and
secretarial occupations; craft and related occupations; personal and protective service occupations;
sales occupations. Finally, the unskilled group consists of: plant and machine occupations; other
occupations.
27Similar gures result from the use of broad o¤shoring.
28Similar results are found by Geischecker and Gorg (2005), using a wage equation approach and
data on 1612 German workers between 1991 and 2000. Labor is distinguished into four categories:
skilled and unskilled workers employed in skill- and unskill-intensive industries. Results show that
international o¤shoring only lowers the relative wage of unskilled workers in low skill-intensive sectors.
29The same result holds true for all other trade and technology controls used by Slaughter.
30A related study by Bruno et al. (2004) tests the e¤ects of nal trade (not o¤shoring) on labor
demand elasticity on a sample of European countries plus U.S. and Japan. Evidence in favor of the
Rodriks hypothesis is at best mixed also in this case.
31Robustness checks are conducted using also a sample of 9905 rms over the same period. The main
di¤erence between the two samples is that the former is unbalanced, whereas the latter is balanced.
32Specically, Senses proxies the threat of o¤shoring by using the share of an industrys imports value
and number of imported products from low-wage countries, as well as a measure of transportation
costs.
33Imports of private services used in this study belong to ve categories: telecommunications,
insurance, nance, business services, and computing and information services.
34Amiti and Wei (2005a) use nine categories of private services to construct their measure of service
o¤shoring: 1) telecommunications; 2) banking and nance, insurance and pension funds, auxiliary
nancial services; 3) renting of machinery; 4) computer services; 5) research and development; 6)
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legal activities, accounting services, market research, and management consultancy; 7) architectural
activities and technical consultancy; 8) advertising; 9) other business services.
35Several studies have analyzed the productivity e¤ects of domestic outsourcing, a practice similar
to o¤shoring but involving other national rms as suppliers. See, among others, Griliches and Siegel
(1992) and ten Raa and Wol¤ (2001).
36See Blinder (2005), Treer (2005a,b), Mankiw and Swagel (2006) for a detailed discussion of this
point.
37A less optimistic view is expressed by Samuelson (2004), who argues that service o¤shoring will
lower aggregate welfare in developed countries, as less developed economies like China and India expe-
rience productivity improvements in their imports (service) sector. However, since such improvements
have the e¤ect of reducing the overall scope for trade in the new equilibrium, the eventual welfare
reduction occurs just because of the overall decline in trade volumes and not as a direct consequence
of service o¤shoring.
38Overall, the number of workers performing these tasks accounts for roughly 30% of total employ-
ment in the U.S. (Jensen and Kletzer, 2005; Liu and Treer, 2006), 18.6% in Canada, 19.2% in the
EU-15, 19.4% in Australia and 13% in South Korea (van Welsum and Vickery, 2005).
39The categories of other private services included in the analysis are: 1) education; 2) insurance;
3) nancial services; 4) telecommunications; 5) advertising; 6) computer and information services; 7)
construction, architectural and engineering; 8) industrial engineering; 9) legal services; 10) manage-
ment, consulting and public relation services; 11) research, development and testing services; 12) other
business, professional and technical services.
40A worker is dened as switching industry (occupation) either if she moves from a 4-digit sector
(occupation) to another between time t and t+ 1, or if she exits/enters unemployment over the same
time interval. Robustness checks are carried out, however, by excluding unemployed workers from the
sample.
41Skilled white-collars include: management, business and nancial occupations; professional and re-
lated occupations. Unskilled white-collars include: service occupations; sales and related occupations;
o¢ ce and administrative support occupations.
42In the same study, Liu and Treer also nd that service o¤shoring does not raise the risk of
unemployment for U.S. white-collar workers. They do nd, instead, that service inshoring to China
and India, generally reduces job insecurity and boosts earning growth for national white-collars.
43To construct his proxy, Crinò uses import-matrix coe¢ cients and una¢ liated imports of twelve
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categories of other private services: 1) nance; 2) insurance; 3) computer and information services;
4) research, development and testing services; 5) business, professional and technical services; 6)
advertising; 7) management, consulting and public relation services; 8) industrial engineering; 9)
installation, maintenance and repair of equipment; 10) legal services; 11) operational leasing; 12)
accounting, auditing and bookkeeping.
44See Riker and Brainard (1997) for a study analyzing exclusively the relationship between a¢ liates
employment in di¤erent locations.
45Due to the lack of wage data for the two groups of workers at the a¢ liate level, the authors
proxy skilled wage with the average wage paid in the three most skill-intensive industries in the coun-
tries where U.S. MNEs have a¢ liates (chemicals, transportation equipment and scientic equipment).
Similarly, unskilled wage is contructed by using average wages in textile, footwear and apparel.
46The sample includes the years 1970, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1994.
43
References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron, 2002a, "Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market," Journal of
Economic Literature, 40(1), pp. 7-72
[2] Acemoglu, Daron, 2002b, "Directed Technical Change," Review of Economic Studies, 69(4), pp.
781-809
[3] Acemoglu, Daron, 2003, "Patterns of Skill Premia," Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), pp.
199-230
[4] Amiti, Mary and Shang-Jin Wei, 2005a, "Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justied?," Economic
Policy, 20(42), pp.308-347
[5] Amiti, Mary and Shang-Jin Wei, 2005b, "Service O¤shoring, Productivity and Employment:
Evidence from the United States," CEPR working paper 5475.
[6] Amiti, Mary and Shang-Jin Wei, 2006, "Service O¤shoring and Productivity: Evidence from
the United States," NBER working paper 11926
[7] Anderton, Robert and Paul Brenton, 1999a, "Trade with the NICs and Wage Inequality: Evi-
dence from the U.K. and Germany," in Paul Brenton and Jacques Pelkman, eds., Global Trade
and European Workers, McMillan: London
[8] Anderton, Robert and Paul Brenton, 1999b, "Outsourcing and Low-Skilled Workers in the UK,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, 51(4), pp. 267-285
[9] Anderton, Robert, Paul Brenton and Eva Oscarsson, 2002a, "Outsourcing and Inequality," Cen-
tre for European Policy Studies Working Document no. 187
[10] Anderton, Robert, Paul Brenton and Eva Oscarsson, 2002b, "Whats Trade Got to Do with It?
Relative Demand for Skills," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv/Review of World Economics, 138(4),
pp. 629-651
[11] Anderton, Robert, Paul Brenton and John Walley, 2006, Globalization and the Labor Market:
Trade, Technology and Less-Skilled Workers in Europe and the United States, Routledged: Lon-
don and New York
[12] Anderton, Robert and Eva Oscarsson, 2006, "Inequality, Trade and Defensive Innovation in the
United States," in Robert Anderton, Paul Brenton and John Walley, eds., Globalization and the
44
Labor Market: Trade, Technology and Less-Skilled Workers in Europe and the United States,
Routledged: London and New York
[13] Antras, Pol, 2003, "Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
118(4), pp. 1375-1418
[14] Antras, Pol, Luis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a, "Organizing O¤shoring: Middle
Managers and Communication Costs," NBER Working Papers 12196
[15] Antras, Pol, Luis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2006b, "O¤shoring in a Knowledge
Economy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1), pp. 31-77
[16] Antras, Pol and Elhanan Helpman, 2004, "Global Sourcing," Journal of Political Economy,
112(3), pp. 552-580
[17] Antras, Pol and Elhanan Helpman, 2006, "Contractual Frictions and Global Sourcing," NBER
Working Paper 12747
[18] Arndt, Sven W., 1997, "Globalization and the Open Economy," North American Journal of
Economics and Finance, 8(1), pp. 7179.
[19] Arndt, Sven W., 1999, "Globalization and Economic Development," Journal of International
Trade and Economic Development, 8 (3), pp. 309318.
[20] Arndt, Sven W. and Henryk Kierzkowski, 2001, Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the
World Economy, Oxford University Press: Oxford
[21] Autor, David, Lawrence F. Katz and Melissa S. Kearney, 2005, "Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality:
Re-Assessing the Revisionists," NBER Working Paper 11627
[22] Autor, David, Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger, 1998, "Computing Inequality: Have
Computers Changed the Labor Market?," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), pp. 1169-
1213
[23] Autor, David, Frank Levy and Richard Murname, 2003, "The Skill Content of Recent Tech-
nological Change: An Empirical Exploration, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), pp.
1279-1333.
[24] Baily, Martin N. and Diana Farrell, 2004. Exploding the Myths of O¤shoring,McKinsey
Quarterly, April 2004
45
[25] Baily, Martin N. and Robert Z. Lawrence, 2004, "What Happened to the Great U.S. Job Ma-
chine? The Role of Trade and Electronic O¤shoring," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
2004(2), pp. 211-284
[26] Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, Anthony J. Venables, et al., 2004, Multinational Firms in the World
Economy, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford
[27] Bardhan, Ashok D. and Cynthia Kroll, 2003, "The New Wave of Outsourcing," Fisher Center
for Real Estate and Urban Economics Working Paper 1103
[28] Bartelsman, Eric J. and Wayne Gray, 1996, "The NBERManufacturing Productivity Database,"
NBER Technical Working Paper 205
[29] Becker, Sasha O., Karolina Ekholm, Robert Jackle and Marc Muendler, 2005, "Location
Choice and Employment Decisions: A Comparison of German and Swedish Multinationals,"
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv/Review of World Economics, 141(4), pp. 693-731
[30] Becker, Sasha O. and Marc Muendler, 2006, "Margins of Multinational Labor Substitution,"
UCSD Department of Economics Discussion Paper 2006-04, University of California San Diego
[31] Bergin, Paul, Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson, 2006, "Outsourcing and Volatility,"
mimeo
[32] Berman, Eli, John Bound and Zvi Griliches, 1994, "Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor
within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109(2), pp. 367-397.
[33] Berman, Eli, John Bound and Stephen Machin, 1998, "Implications of Skill-Biased Technological
Change: International Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), pp. 1245-1279
[34] Bernard, Andrew B. and Bradford J. Jensen, 1997, "Exporters, Skill Upgrading, and the Wage
Gap," Journal of International Economics, 42(1-2), pp. 3-31
[35] Berndt, Ernst R. and Laurits R. Christensen, 1974, "Testing for the Existence of a Consistent
Aggregate Index of Labor Inputs," American Economic Review, 64(3), pp.391-404
[36] Berndt, Ernst R. and Chaterine Morrison, 1995, "High-Tech Capital Formation and Labor
Composition in U.S. Manufacturing Industries," Journal of Econometrics, 65(1), pp. 9-43.
46
[37] Bhagwati, Jagdish and Vivek H. Dehejia, 1994, "Freer Trade and Wages of the UnskilledIs Marx
Striking Again?," in Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin Kosters, eds., Trade and Wages, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.
[38] Bhagwati, Jagdish, Arvind Panagariya and T.N. Srinivasan, 2004, "The Muddles over Outsourc-
ing," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(4), pp. 93-114
[39] Blackorby, Charles, Daniel Primont and Robert R. Russell, 1977, "On Testing Separability
Restrictions with Flexible Functional Forms," Journal of Econometrics, 5, pp. 195-209
[40] Blinder, Alan S., 2005, "Fear of O¤shoring," CEPS Working Paper 119
[41] Blomstrom, Magnus, Gunnar, Fors and Robert E., Lipsey, 1997, "Foreign Direct Investment and
Employment: Home Country Experience in the United States and Sweden," Economic Journal,
107(445), pp. 1787-1797
[42] Blomstrom, Magnus and Ari Kokko, 2000, "Outward Investment, Employment, and Wages in
Swedish Multinationals," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 16(3), pp. 76-89
[43] Bound, John and George Johnson, 1992, "Changes in the Structure of Wages during the 1980s:
An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations," American Economic Review, 82(3), pp. 371-392
[44] Braconier, Henrik and Karolina Ekholm, 2000, "Swedish Multinationals and Competition from
High- and Low-Wage Locations," Review of International Economics, 8(3), pp. 448-461
[45] Brainard, Lael S., 1997, "An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Trade-O¤
between Multinational Sales and Trade," American Economic Review, 87(4), pp. 520-544
[46] Brainard, Lael S. and Robert E. Litan, 2004, "O¤shoring Service Jobs: Bane or Boon and What
to Do?," The Brookings Institution Policy Brief 132
[47] Brainard, Lael S., Robert E. Litan and Nicholas Warren, 2005, "Insuring Americas Workers in
a New Era of O¤shoring," The Brookings Institution Policy Brief 143
[48] Brainard, Lael S. and David A. Riker, 1997, "Are U.S. Multinationals Exporting U.S. Jobs?,"
NBER Working Paper 5958
[49] Bruno, Giovanni S.F. and Anna M. Falzoni, 2003, "Multinational Corporations, Wages and
Employment: Do Adjustment Costs Matter?," Applied Economics, 35, pp. 1277-1290
47
[50] Bruno, Giovanni S.F., Anna M. Falzoni and Rodolfo Helg, 2004, "Measuring the E¤ect of Global-
ization on Labour Demand Elasticity: An Empirical Application to OECD Countries,"Working
Paper CESPRI 153, Università Bocconi
[51] Burgess, Simon M. and Michael M. Knetter, 1998, "An International Comparison of Employment
Adjustment to Exchange Rate Fluctuations," Review of International Economics, 6(1), pp. 151-
163
[52] Campa, Jose and Linda S. Goldberg, 1997, "The Evolving External Orientation of Manufacturing
Industries: Evidence from Four Countries," NBER Working Papers 5919
[53] Crinò, Rosario, 2006, "Are U.S. White-Collar Really At-Risk of Service O¤shoring," CESPRI
Working Paper 183, Università Bocconi
[54] Deardor¤, Alan V., 2005, "A Trade Theorists Take on Skilled-Labor Outsourcing," International
Review of Economics and Finance, 14(3), pp.259-271
[55] Denny, Michael G.S. and Melvyn Fuss, 1977, "The Use of Approximation Analysis to Test for
Separability and the Existence of Consistent Aggregates," American Economic Review, 67(3),
pp. 404-418.
[56] Desay, Mihir R., Fritz, C. Foley and James R. Hines Jr., 2005, "Foreign Direct Investment and
Domestic Economic Activity," NBER Working Paper 11717
[57] Desjonqueres, Thibaut, Stephen Machin and John Van Reenen, 1999, "Another Nail in the
Co¢ n? Or Can the Trade Based Explanation of Changing Skill Structures Be Resurrected?,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101(4), pp. 533-554
[58] Dunne, Timothy, John Haltiwanger and Kenneth R. Troske, 1997, "Technology and Jobs: Sec-
ular Changes and Cyclical Dynamics," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
46, pp. 107-178
[59] Egger, Harmut and Peter Hegger, 2001, "Cross-Border Sourcing and Outward Processing in EU
Manufacturing," North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 12(3), pp. 243-256
[60] Egger, Harmut and Peter Egger, 2005, "Labor Market E¤ects of Outsourcing under Industrial
Interdependence," International Review of Economics and Finance, 14(3), pp. 349-63
48
[61] Egger, Peter, Michael Pfa¤ermayr and Andrea Weber, 2006, "Sectoral Adjustment of Employ-
ment: The Impact of Outsourcing and Trade at the Micro-Level," Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics, forthcoming
[62] Egger, Peter, Michael Pfa¤ermayr and Yvonne Wolfmayr-Schnitzer, 2001, "The International
Fragmentation of Austrian Manufacturing: The E¤ects of Outsourcing on Productivity and
Wages," North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 12(3), pp. 257-272
[63] Ekholm, Karolina, Rikard Forslid and James Markusen, 2003, "Export-Platform Foreign Direct
Investment," NBER Working Papers 9517
[64] Ekholm, Karolina and Katarina Hakkala, 2005 "The E¤ect of O¤shoring on Labor Demand:
Evidence from Sweden," CEPR Working Paper 5648
[65] Ekholm, Karolina and Karen Helene Midelfart-Knarvik, 2005, Relative Wages and Trade-
Induced Changes in Technology," European Economic Review, 49(6), pp.1637-1663
[66] Epifani, Paolo and Gino Gancia, 2004, "The Skill Bias of World Trade," Economics Working
Papers 833, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
[67] Epifani, Paolo and Gino Gancia, 2006, "Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and Factor
Prices," Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(4), pp. 583-598
[68] Epstein, Larry G. and Michael G.S. Denny, 1983, "The Multivariate Flexible Accelerator Model:
Its Empirical Restrictions and an Application to U.S. Manufacturing," Econometrica, 51(3), pp.
647-674
[69] Falk, Martin and Bertrand M. Koebel, 2001, "A Dynamic Heterogeneous Labour Demand Model
for German Manufacturing," Applied Economics, 33(3), pp. 339-348
[70] Falk, Martin and Bertrand M. Koebel, 2002, "Outsourcing, Imports and Labour Demand,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(4), pp. 567-586
[71] Falzoni, Anna M. and Mara Grasseni, 2003, "Outward FDI and Skill Upgrading in the Italian
Labor Market," paper presented at AIEL, 23rd Convegno Nazionale di Economia del Lavoro,
Messina, September 25-26, 2003
[72] Feenstra, Robert C., 1998, Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global
Economy,Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), pp. 31-50.
49
[73] Feenstra, Robert C., 2004, Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, Princeton
University Press: Princeton and Oxford
[74] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson, 1996, "Globalization, Outsourcing and Wage In-
equality," American Economic Review, 86(2), pp. 240-245.
[75] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson, 1997, "Foreign Direct Investment and Relative
Wages: Evidence from Mexicos Maquiladoras," Journal of International Economics, 42(3-4),
pp. 371-393
[76] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson, 1999, "The Impact of Outsourcing and High-
Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the United States, 1979-1990," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 114(3), pp. 907-940
[77] Feenstra, Robert C. and G. H. Hanson, 2003, "Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality:
A Survey of Trade and Wages," in, K. Choi and J. Harrigan, eds., Handbook of International
Trade, Basil Blackwell
[78] Feenstra, Robert C. and Barbara Spencer, 2005, "Contractual Versus Generic Outsourcing: The
Role of Proximity," NBER Working Paper 11885
[79] Fitzenberger, Bernd, 1999, "Wages and Employment Across Skill Groups: An Analysis for West
Germany," ZEW Economic Studies, vol. 6. Heidelberg: Physica; Mannheim
[80] Forrester Research, 2002, "3.3 Million US Service Jobs To Go O¤shore," Cambridge, MA: For-
rester Research
[81] Forrester Research, 2004a, "Two-Speed Europe: Why 1 Million Jobs Will Move O¤shore,"
Cambridge, MA: Forrester Research
[82] Forrester Research, 2004b, "Near-Term Growth of O¤shoring Accelerating," Cambridge, MA:
Forrester Research
[83] Freeman, Richard B. and Lawrence F. Katz, 1995, Di¤erences and Changes in Wage Structures,
NBER, Comparative Labor Markets Series
[84] Freund, Caroline and Diana Weinhold, 2002, "The Internet and International Trade in Services,"
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 92(2), pp. 236-240
50
[85] Garner, Alan C., 2004, "O¤shoring in the Service Sector: Economic Impact and Policy Issues,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City - Economic Review
[86] Geishecker, Ingo, 2006, "Does Outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe Really Threaten
Manual WorkersJobs in Germany?," World Economy, 29(5), pp. 559-583
[87] Geishecker, Ingo and Holger Gorg, 2005, "Do Unskilled Workers Always Lose from Fragmenta-
tion?," North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 16(1), pp. 81-92
[88] Goldberg, Linda, Joseph Tracy and Stephanie Aaronson, 1999, "Exchange Rates and Employ-
ment Instability: Evidence from Matched CPS Data," American Economic Review, 89(2), pp.
204-210
[89] Gorg, Holger and Aoife Hanley, 2005, "Labour Demand E¤ects of International Outsourcing:
Evidence from Plant-Level Data," International Review of Economics and Finance, 14(3), pp.
365-376
[90] Greenaway, David and Douglas Nelson, 2001, Globalization and Labour Markets: A Review
of the Literature, in David Greenaway and Douglas Nelson, eds., Globalization and Labour
Markets, Vols. I and II, Edward Elgar
[91] Griliches, Zvi and Donald Siegel, 1992, "Purchased Services, Outsourcing, Computers, and Pro-
ductivity in Manufacturing," in Output measurement in the service sectors, pp.429-458, National
Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 56., Chicago and London: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press
[92] Grossman, Gene, 1987, "The Employment and Wage E¤ects of Import Competition," Journal
of International Economics, 2, pp. 1-23
[93] Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman, 2003, "Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilib-
rium," Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3), pp. 317-327
[94] Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman, 2004, "Managerial Incentives and the International
Organization of Production," Journal of International Economics, 63(2), pp. 237-262
[95] Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman, 2005, "Outsourcing in a Global Economy," Review of
Economic Studies, 72(1), pp. 135-59
51
[96] Grossman, Gene M. and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a, "The Rise of O¤shoring: Its Not
Wine for Cloth Anymore," paper presented at the Economic Symposium "The New economic
Geography: E¤ects and Policy Implications," Federal Reserve Bank of Kasas City
[97] Grossman, Gene M. and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2006b,"Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of
O¤shoring," NBER Working Paper 12721
[98] Hall, Robert E. and Dale W. Jorgenson, 1969, "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Reply and
Further Results," American Economic Review, 59(3), pp. 388-401
[99] Hamermesh, Daniel S., 1993, Labor Demand, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Chich-
ester, U.K.
[100] Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni Jr. and Matthew J. Slaughter, 2003, "Expansion
Abroad and the Domestic Operations of U.S. Multinational Firms," mimeo
[101] Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni Jr. and Matthew J. Slaughter, 2005, "Vertical Produc-
tion Networks in Multinational Firms," Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4), pp. 664-678
[102] Hansson, Par, 2000, "Relative Demand for Skills in Swedish Manufacturing: Technology or
Trade?," Review of International Economics, 8(3), pp. 533-555
[103] Hansson, Par, 2005, "Skill Upgrading and Production Transfer within Swedish Multinationals,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107(4), pp. 673-692
[104] Harrison, Ann E. and Margaret S. McMillan, 2006, "Outsourcing Jobs? Multinationals and US
Employment," NBER Working Paper 12372
[105] Haskel, Jonathan and Ylva Heden, 1999, "Computers and the Demand for Skilled Labour:
Industry- and Establishment-Level Panel Evidence for the UK," Economic Journal, 109(454),
pp. C68-C79
[106] Haskel, Jonathan and Matthew J. Slaughter, 2002, "Does the Sector Bias of Skill-Biased Techni-
cal Change Explain Changing Skill Premia?," European Economic Review, 46(10), pp. 1757-1783
[107] Head, Keith and John Ries, 2002, "O¤shore Production and Skill Upgrading by Japanese Man-
ufacturing Firms," Journal of International Economics, 58(1), pp. 81-105
52
[108] Helg, Rodolfo and Lucia Tajoli, 2005, "Patterns of International Fragmentation of Production
and the Relative Demand for Labor," North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 16(2),
pp. 233-254
[109] Helpman, Elhanan, 2006, "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economic
Literature, 44(4), pp. 580-630
[110] Heshmati, Almas, 2003, "Productivity Growth, E¢ ciency and Outsourcing in Manufacturing
and Service Industries," Journal of Economic Surveys, 17(1), pp. 79-112
[111] Hijzen, Alexander, 2005, "A Birds Eye View of International Outsourcing: Data, Measurement
and Labour Demand E¤ects," Economie Internationale, 104(4), pp. 45-63
[112] Hijzen, Alexander, 2006, "International Outsourcing, Technological Change, and Wage Inequal-
ity," Review of International Economics, forthcoming
[113] Hijzen, Alexander, Holger Gorg and Robert C. Hine, 2005, "International Outsourcing and the
Skill Structure of Labour Demand in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, 115(506), pp.
860-878
[114] Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Keong T. Woo, 2005, "The Impact of Outsourcing to China on Hong
Kongs Labor Market," American Economic Review, 95(5), pp. 1673-1687
[115] Hummels, David, Jun Ishii and Kei-Mu Yi, 2001, "The Nature and Growth of Vertical Special-
ization in World Trade," Journal of International Economics, 54(1), pp. 75-96
[116] Hummels, David, Dana Rapoport and Kei-Mu Yi, 1998, "Vertical Specialization and the Chang-
ing Nature of World Trade," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June,
pp. 79-99
[117] Jensen, Bradford J. and Lori Kletzer, 2005, "Tradable Services: Understanding the Scope and
Impact of Services O¤shoring," in Lael Brainard and Susan M. Collins, eds ., O¤shoring White-
Collar Work - The Issues and the Implications, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Trade Forum
2005
[118] Katz, Lawrence F. and David H. Autor, 1999 "Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings
Inequality," in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, edition
1, volume 3, chapter 26, pp. 1463-1555, Elsevier
53
[119] Katz, Lawrence F. and Kevin M. Murphy, 1992, "Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply
and Demand Factors," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), pp. 35-78
[120] Kirkegaard, Jacob F., 2004, "Outsourcing - Stains on the White-Collar?," mimeo
[121] Klein, Michael W., Scott Schuh and Robert K. Triest, 2002, "Job Creation, Job Destruction
and International Competition: A Literature Review," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working
Paper 02-7
[122] Klein, Michael W., Scott Schuh and Robert K. Triest, 2003a, "Job creation, job destruction,
and the real exchange rate," Journal of International Economics, 59(2), pp. 239-265
[123] Klein, Michael W., Scott Schuh and Robert K. Triest, 2003b, Job Creation, Job Destruction and
International Competition, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
[124] Kletzer, Lori G., 1998, "Trade and Job Loss in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979-94," in Robert C. Feen-
stra, eds., The Impact of International Trade on Wages, University of Chicago Press: Chicago
[125] Kletzer, Lori G., 2001, Job Loss from Imports: Measuring the Costs, Institute for International
Economics, Washington D.C.
[126] Kletzer, Lori G., 2002, Imports, Exports, and Jobs: What does trade mean for employment and
job loss?, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
[127] Kletzer, Lori G. and Robert E. Litan, 2001, "A Prescription to Relieve Worker Anxiety," Institute
for International Economics Policy Brief, PB01-2, March
[128] Koebel, Bertrand M., 2006, "Exports and Labor Demand: Searching for Functional Structure
in Multi-Output Multi-Skill Technologies," Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol.
24(1), pp. 91-103.
[129] Kohler, Wilhelm, 2001, "A Specic-Factor View on Outsourcing," North American Journal of
Economics and Finance, 12(1), pp. 31-53
[130] Kohler, Wilhelm, 2004, "International Outsourcing and Factor Prices with Multistage Produc-
tion," Economic Journal, 114(494), pp. C166-C185
[131] Konings, Jozef and Alan P. Murphy, 2006, "Do Multinational Enterprises Relocate Employ-
ment to Low-Wage Regions? Evidence from European Multinationals," Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv/Review of World Economics, 142(2), pp. 267-286
54
[132] Kroll, Cynthia A., 2005, "State and Metropolitan Area Impacts of the O¤shore Outsourcing of
Business Services and IT," Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics Working Paper
293
[133] Krugman, Paul R., 2000, "Technology, Trade and Factor Prices," Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 50(1), pp. 51-71
[134] Lawrence, Robert Z. and Matthew J. Slaughter, 1993, "International Trade and American
Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?," Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Microeconomics, pp. 161-210
[135] Leamer, Edward E., 1996, "In Search of Stolper-Samuelson E¤ects on U.S. Wages," NBER
Working Paper 5427
[136] Levy, Frank and Richard Murname, 2004, The New Division of Labor, Princeton University
Press, Princeton
[137] Lipsey, Robert E., 1997, "Foreign Production by U.S. Firms and Parent Firm Employment,"
NBER Working Paper 7357
[138] Lipsey, Robert E., 2006, "Measuring International Trade in Services," NBER Working Paper
12271
[139] Lipsey, Robert E., Eric D. Ramstetter and Magnus Blomstrom, 2000, "Outward FDI and Parent
Exports and Employment: Japan, the United States, and Sweden," NBER Working Paper 7623
[140] Liu, Runjuan and Daniel Treer, 2006, "The Impact of Service O¤shoring and Inshoring on the
U.S. Labor Market," mimeo
[141] Lorentowicz, Andzelika, Dalia Marin and Alexander Raubold, 2005, "Is Human Capital Losing
from Outsourcing? Evidence for Austria and Poland," CEPR Discussion Papers 5344
[142] Machin, Stephen, 1996, "Changes in the Relative Demand for Skills in the U.K. Labor Market,"
in Alison Booth and Dennis Snower, eds., Acquiring Skills: Market Failures, Their Symptoms
and Policy Responses, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA
[143] Machin, Stephen and John Van Reenen, 1998, "Technology and Changes in Skill Structure:
Evidence from Seven OECD Countries," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), pp. 1215-1244
55
[144] Mankiw, Gregory N. and Phillip Swagel, 2006, "The Politics and Economics of O¤shore Out-
sourcing," Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(5), pp. 1027-1056
[145] Mann, Catherine L., 2003, "Globalization of IT Services and White-Collar Jobs: The Next Wave
of Productivity Growth," International economics, Policy Brief 03-11
[146] Markusen, James, 2005, "Modeling the O¤shoring of White-Collar Services: From Comparative
Advantage to the New Theories of Trade and FDI," in Lael Brainard and Susan M. Collins, eds .,
O¤shoring White-Collar Work - The Issues and the Implications,Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Trade Forum 2005
[147] Mellander, Erik, 1999, "The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Labour Demand and Skill Biased
Technical Change," IFAU Working Paper Series 1999:9
[148] Minondo, Asier and Gloria Rubert, 2006, "The E¤ect of Outsourcing on the Demand for Skills
in the Spanish Manufacturing Industry," Applied Economics Letters, 13(9), pp.599-604
[149] Morrison, Catherine and Donald Siegel, 2001, "The Impacts of Technology, Trade and Outsourc-
ing on Employment and Labor Composition," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 103(2), pp.
241-264
[150] Munch, Jakob R., 2005, "International Outsourcing and Individual Job Separations," Depart-
ment of Economics Working Paper 05-11, University of Copenhagen
[151] Neary, Peter, 2002, Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality,Review of International Eco-
nomics, 10, pp. 680-693.
[152] Olsen, Karsten B., 2006, "Productivity Impacts of O¤shoring and Outsourcing: A Review,"
OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry (STI), Working Paper 2006/1
[153] Osburn, Jane, 2001, "Occupational Upgrading and Changes in Capital Usage in U.S.," Review
of Income and Wealth, 47(4), pp. 451-472
[154] Revenga, Ana L., 1992, "Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on Employment
and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), pp. 255-284
[155] Riker, David A. and Lael S. Brainard, 1997, "U.S. Multinationals and Competition from Low
Wage Countries," NBER Working Paper 5959
56
[156] Rishi, Meenakshi and Sweta C. Saxena, 2004, "Is Outsourcing Really as Bad as It Is Made to
Sound? A Re-Assessment and Some Perspective," EconWPA Working Paper, Macroeconomics,
0508009
[157] Rodrik, Dani, 1997, Has globalization gone too far?, Institute for International Economics: Wash-
ington, D.C.
[158] Sachs, Je¤rey D. and Howard J. Shatz, 1994, "Trade and Jobs in U.S. Manufacturing," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1994(1), pp. 1-84
[159] Samuelson, Paul A., 2004, "Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Conrm Arguments of Main-
stream Economists Supporting Globalization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3), pp.
135-146
[160] Schultze, Charles L., 2004, "O¤shoring, Import Competition, and the Jobless Recovery," The
Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 136
[161] Senses, Mine Zeynep, 2006, "The E¤ects of Outsourcing on the Elasticity of Labor Demand,"
Center for Economic Studies Working Paper 06-07, U.S. Census Bureau
[162] Slaughter, Matthew, 1995, "Multinational Corporations, Outsourcing, and American Wage Di-
vergence," NBER Working Paper 5253
[163] Slaughter, Matthew, 2000a, What Are the Results of Product-Price Studies and What Can We
Learn from Their Di¤erences?,in Robert C. Feenstra, eds., The Impact of International Trade
on Wages, pp. 129-165, University of Chicago Press for the NBER: Chicago.
[164] Slaughter, Matthew, 2000b, "Production Transfer within Multinational Enterprises and Ameri-
can Wages," Journal of International Economics, 50(2), pp. 449-472
[165] Slaughter, Matthew, 2001, "International Trade and Labor-Demand Elasticities," Journal of
International Economics, 54(1), pp. 27-56
[166] Spencer, Barbara, 2005, "International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working
Paper 11418
[167] Strauss-Kahn, Vanessa, 2003, "The Role of Globalization in the Within-Industry Shift Away
from Unskilled Workers in France," NBER Working Paper 9716
57
[168] Ten Raa, Thijs and Edward N. Wol¤, 2001, "Outsourcing of Services and the Productivity
Recovery in U.S. Manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s," Journal of Productivity Analysis,
16(2), pp. 149-165
[169] Thoenig, Mathias and Thierry Verdier, 2003, A Theory of Defensive Skill-Biased Innovation
and International Trade,American Economic Review, 93(3), pp. 709-728.
[170] Treer, Daniel, 2005a, "O¤shoring: Threats and Opportunities," in Lael Brainard and Susan
M. Collins, eds ., O¤shoring White-Collar Work - The Issues and the Implications,Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Trade Forum 2005
[171] Treer, Daniel, 2005b, "Policy Responses to the New O¤shoring: Think Globally, Invest Lo-
cally," paper prepared for Industry Canadas Roundtable on O¤shoring, March 30, 2005
[172] UNCTAD, 2006, "World Investment Report: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies:
Implications for Developments," United Nations, New York and Geneva
[173] Van Welsum, Desirée and Xavier Reif, 2005, "Potential O¤shoring: Evidence from Selected
OECD Countries," in Lael Brainard and Susan M. Collins, eds ., O¤shoring White-Collar Work
- The Issues and the Implications, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Trade Forum 2005
[174] Van Welsum, Desirée and Graham Vickery, 2005, "Potential O¤-Shoring of ICT-Intensive Occu-
pations," in Enhancing the Performance of the Services Sector, pp. 179-204, OECD, Paris and
Washington, D.C.
[175] Wood, Adrian, 1994, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a
Skill-Driven World, Oxford University Press: Oxford
[176] Wood, Adrian, 1995, "How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers," Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9(3), pp. 57-80
[177] Yan, Beilling, 2006, "Demand for Skills in Canada: The Role of Foreign Outsourcing," Canadian
Journal of Economics, 39(1), pp. 53-67
58
 59
Figure 1 – Growth in FDI Outflows as Compared with GDP Growth: World and  
      Developed Countries (Indexes, 1975 = 100) 
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Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. 
Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database; World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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Figure 2 – Material and Service Offshoring in U.S. Manufacturing 
(Share of imported intermediate goods and services on total non-energy inputs    
purchases) 
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Note: Unweighed manufacturing averages, computed over 450 4-digit SIC industries (material offshoring) 
and 135 3-digit SIC industries (service offshoring). Service imports include the following twelve categories 
of “Other Private Services”: financial services; insurance services; computer and information services; 
research, development and testing services; business, professional and technical services; advertising; 
management consulting and public relation services; industrial engineering; installation, maintenance and 
repair of equipment; legal services; operational leasing; accounting, auditing and bookkeeping. 
Source: data on material offshoring between 1972 and  1990 comes from Feenstra and Hanson (1999); for 
the period 1995-2002, material offshoring has been constructed using input-output data from BEA (“1997 
Benchmark Input-Output Data”), data on non-energy inputs purchases from Bureau of the Census (“Annual 
Survey of Manufactures”) and trade data from NBER (“U.S. Trade by 1987-SIC category”). Service 
offshoring has been constructed using data on services imports from BEA (“U.S. International Services: 
Cross-Border Trade 1986-2004, and Sales Through Affiliates, 1986-2003”, Table 5 and 7), import matrix 
from BEA (“1997 Benchmark Input-Output Data”) and data on non-energy inputs purchases from Bureau 
of the Census (“Annual Survey of Manufactures”). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61
Figure 3 – Skilled / Unskilled Employment and Wage Ratios in U.S. Manufacturing 
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Note: Unweighed manufacturing averages. Skilled and unskilled workers are proxied by non-production 
and production workers. 
Source: NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database 
